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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Application Adaptive Bandwidth Management Using 
Real–Time Network Monitoring 
 
by 
 
 
Amit Grover 
 
 
Application adaptive bandwidth management is a strategy for ensuring secure and reliable 
network operation in the presence of undesirable applications competing for a network’s crucial 
bandwidth, covert channels of communication via non-standard traffic on well-known ports, and 
coordinated Denial of Service attacks. The study undertaken here explored the classification, 
analysis and management of the network traffic on the basis of ports and protocols used, type of 
applications, traffic direction and flow rates on the East Tennessee State University’s campus-
wide network. Bandwidth measurements over a nine-month period indicated bandwidth abuse of 
less than 0.0001% of total network bandwidth. The conclusion suggests the use of the defense-
in-depth approach in conjunction with the KHYATI (Knowledge, Host hardening, Yauld 
monitoring, Analysis, Tools and Implementation) paradigm to ensure effective information 
assurance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 “It’s unimportant whether we take out a computer center [controlling key weapon systems, 
electrical girds and telecommunications] with a bomb…. or a denial of service program.” 
 
Department of Defense spokesman discussing 
  the cyber-attack strategy in the run up to 
    Operation Iraqi Freedom1. 
 
 
“…if we fail on [cyber] defense, the nation would be at risk….” 
 
 
Maj. Gen. J David Bryan, Commander of the 
                                      Joint Task Force-Computer Network Operations 
             and vice director of the Defense Information 
      Systems Agency2. 
 
1.0 Information Assurance 
  
Operation Iraqi Freedom has etched in stone the role of information warfare, as this was 
the first major armed conflict that depended heavily on IT. Even in a war and sanctions-ravaged 
economy like Iraq with hardly any IT infrastructure, email messages to high ranking Iraqi 
military officials3 were used to soften the Iraqis’ attitude towards US military action by 
encouraging them to surrender and to help in toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime.  
Information Warfare is broadly classified into two branches, viz., Information Denial and 
Information Assurance. Information assurance, the study of how to ensure the availability and 
security of critical network operations at all times, is emerging as a key concern in military and 
corporate organizations alike. Maj. Gen Bryan, the coordinator of the Therminator project2 (a 
network security tool being jointly developed by the DOD, National Security Agency and 
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Lancope Inc.) emphasizes the need for Therminator–like tools to deal more quickly and 
effectively with exploitation of vulnerabilities like the recent SQL Slammer worm.   
This thesis is concerned with an aspect of information assurance: the use of application 
adaptive bandwidth management to counter the threats posed by undesirable and non-standard 
traffic on well-known ports.  A network’s bandwidth is the maximum amount of data that that 
network can carry, measured in bits per second (bps). Bandwidth management is the practice of 
allocating a network’s bandwidth, based on considerations like perceived priority and fair use.  
Application adaptive bandwidth management is a form of bandwidth management that uses an 
application’s perceived importance to allocate bandwidth, based on overall network traffic.  
Strategies for application adaptive bandwidth management attempt to ensure that the most 
mission critical applications get bandwidth—and that malicious codes do not.  
This thesis describes the study of application adaptive bandwidth management and 
unauthorized use of standard network channels for communication. Covert channels of 
communication that use well known ports for non-standard traffic are a major threat to the 
security of any network. According to the Dshield4 website, the top ten ports probed over a 
period of one month (from 15 May to 15 June 2003) as shown in table 1.1 indicates the main 
targets to be port 137 (netbios-ns) and port 80 (HTTP). Although port 80—one of the most 
widely used ports—has been assigned for World Wide Web HTTP services, the following5 
Trojans also use the same port: 711trojan, AckCmd, BackEnd, BO2000Plug-Ins, Cafeini, 
CGIBackdoor, Executor, GodMessage4Creator, GodMessage, Hooker, IISworm, MTX, NCX, 
Noob, Ramen, ReverseWWWTunnel, RingZero, RTB666, Seeker, WANRemote, 
WebDownloader and WebServerCT. 
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Table 1.1: Top Ten Probed Ports 
Service Name Port Number Explanation 
netbios-ns 137 NETBIOS Name Service 
www 80 World Wide Web HTTP 
ms-sql-m 1434 Microsoft-SQL-Monitor 
microsoft-ds 445 Win2k+ Server Message Block 
netbios-ssn 139 NETBIOS Session Service 
eDonkey2000 4662 eDonkey2000 Server Default Port 
smtp 25 Simple Mail Transfer 
--- 41170   
ident 113   
--- 0   
 
 An open port is a potential security hole that can be used by hackers to access computers. 
Covert channels of communication render the target network susceptible to remote 
administration. The potential for damage depends solely on the maliciousness of the attacker’s 
intent. The damage can range from a complete loss of critical data to involuntary use of the 
network for illegal transmission of copyrighted digital content. A compromised network may 
also be used to carry out a coordinated denial of service attack. Unauthorized activity on the 
network, even if it involves ‘un-harmful probing’, competes for available network bandwidth, an 
important institutional resource. With the ever- increasing number of users and applications, it 
becomes difficult to ensure adequate bandwidth and quality of service for mission critical 
applications. According to a Carnegie Mellon University review6, “…traditional Ethernet-and-
IP network elements (routers and switches) perform well in lightly-loaded situations, but 
problems arise as traffic increases. For example, shared-access Ethernet rapidly degrades in 
throughput after about 30% utilization. In this situation, the number of collisions and 
retransmissions grows quickly, reducing the network efficiency…” An increase in the link 
utilization might force the routers to drop the packets after a certain limit.  Since resources are 
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limited, the cost factor rules out an indefinite upgrading of the network bandwidth capacity as a 
viable solution. 
The goal of this thesis was to identify and minimize the use of excessive bandwidth by 
undesirable applications and minimize port abuse and flow of malicious data on the ETSU 
campus network. In a typical university setting, students may use bandwidth for file swapping 
utilities aimed at downloading large multimedia files (pirated movies and MP3s) and warez. 
Other activities such as IRC applications and MUD games might be used as a gateway by 
Trojans that can compromise network security by allowing remote administration. These 
activities steal bandwidth from critical primary applications (administrational/educational), 
jeopardize the overall network security, and may even put the host institution into legal jeopardy.  
In October 2002, for example7, four college students in San Jose, California were sued by the 
recording industry for exploiting the academic resources of their campus networks for file-
swapping services. The Recording Industry Association of America accuses them of illegally 
swapping about a million songs without the permission of the copyright holders and seeks a 
maximum penalty of $150,000 per song from each student. According to the news report, “The 
recording industry telegraphed its campus crackdown last October putting 2,300 university 
administrators on notice to curb student behavior—or face legal consequences”.  At ETSU itself 
there have been “several instances of abuses” of network resources as pointed out by President 
Paul E Stanton’s memorandum8 regarding “Utilization of Computer Resources at East Tennessee 
State University”. The memorandum specifically prohibits all employees from indulging in 
“deliberate and wasteful use of [computer] resources” for unauthorized processing of data / files 
“that are not associated with their assigned duties”. 
 
 19
1.1 Synopsis of the Approach Taken  
In the initial stages of the study itself, the lack of a single-piece solution became 
apparent. To achieve the objectives, I used a combination of various tools such as firewalls, 
packet-shapers, protocol analyzers, port scanners, network traffic monitoring tools, anti-virus 
programs and service management tools. These tools are covered in detail in sections 2 and 3. 
The classic approach for securing a network against malicious code involves port based filtering 
and the quest for a solution led me to a firewall—the ‘seemingly-obvious’ choice for blocking 
undesirable data as well as restricting covert channels of communication.   
 
1.2 Firewalling  
This strategy involves identifying non-standard ports generally used by Trojans and other 
malicious code as ‘rogue ports’ and then blocking these ports using firewalls.  While firewalls 
can be used effectively to block known rogue ports, they are ineffective against undesirable 
applications such as file swapping utilities or Trojans that can use http traffic to infect the 
machine and then switch to un-allocated ports that are not being blocked by firewalls. Secondly, 
firewalls by themselves cannot provide bandwidth management by ensuring availability of 
bandwidth for critical applications. This necessitates the use of a packet-shaper in conjunction 
with the firewall. 
 
1.3 Packet-Shaping 
Packet shapers manage network bandwidth usage to a finer degree than what is possible 
with only switches or routers. They help to prioritize network usage by identifying ‘critical’ as 
well as ‘less desirable’ components of the traffic stream and earmarking more bandwidth for 
critical applications while restricting the amount of bandwidth available for less desirable 
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applications. Packet shapers classify network traffic by evaluating traffic flow on the basis of 
application-specific ports, protocol family (including transport protocols like TCP and UDP), IP 
address, port, the IP precedence value and URL. A CNN news report dated 10 October 2002 and 
titled “Student’s file sharing overloads college networks”9 indicates that about 740 educational 
institutes in America were using Packeteer’s PacketShaper tool to manage bandwidth. 
 
1.4 Hybrid Strategy 
While a firewall would block data on Trojan ports and a packet shaper would allow 
bandwidth allocation for mission critical applications, their use does not solve the problem of 
non-standard traffic on standard desirable ports. This led me to explore the use of port scanners 
for identifying open ports and protocol analyzers for content based monitoring of the network 
traffic stream. Anti-virus tools were used for identifying known malicious code based on 
signature matching in the network traffic. While these tools allowed detection of malicious code 
in the traffic, to be able to trace the actual transmission route from the source to the destination, I 
relied on network traffic monitoring and service management tools. Thus the non-availability of 
a “silver-bullet”10 solution led to the use of a hybrid strategy that didn’t depend solely on any one 
single tool.  
 
1.5 Key results 
 Yauld network monitoring, together with aggressive vulnerability management, helped 
to minimize bandwidth abuse on the ETSU network. Actual bandwidth measurements spread 
over a nine-month period from August 2002 to April 2003 indicated the percentage bandwidth 
abuse to be a mere 0.000073393%. These measurements were based on the actual network traffic 
inside the firewall and do not account for the substantial amount of undesirable traffic that is 
 21
blocked by the firewall itself. The bandwidth measurements highlighted HTTP traffic as the most 
predominant protocol in the traffic stream—constituting as high as 76% of the total traffic. Of 
the incoming malicious code that passed through the firewall, the Klez virus code was the most 
predominant with 25,591 distinct occurrences in the period under consideration. Detailed 
bandwidth measurements for incoming as well as outgoing traffic—organized as mission critical, 
desirable, non-critical, and rogue—are tabulated in the section 4. The lessons learnt made me 
conclude that effective information assurance in an environment like ETSU’s requires the use of 
the defense- in-depth security in conjunction with KHYATI (Knowledge, Host hardening, Yauld 
monitoring, Analysis, Tools and Implementation) network management. The defense-in-depth 
strategy relies on multiple layers of defense thereby eliminating one single point-of-failure for 
the entire system. Complementing this approach with the KHYATI paradigm would result in 
achieving information assurance goals in an effective and efficient manner. 
 
1.6 Structure for the balance of the thesis 
The balance of this thesis is divided into four sections. Section 2 discusses the concept of 
ports, how they can be abused to compromise security as well as techniques for detecting and 
blocking the invalid use of ports. Section 3 concentrates on specifics such as the tools and the 
methodology used to achieve the goals. Section 4 covers the results of the thesis in detail.  
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of defense-in-depth, the ‘KHYATI’ paradigm, and lessons 
learned.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
PORT ABUSE AND COUNTERMEASURES 
 
2.1 Characteristics of the Transport Layer  
The ISO’s Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model divides 
communications architectures into seven distinct layers. OSI  Layer 4, the ‘Transport’ layer,  is 
tasked with providing efficient and reliable end-to-end communication. According to Andrew S 
Tanenbaum11,  
“… (The Transport layer) is the heart of the whole protocol hierarchy. Its task is to 
provide reliable, cost-effective data transport from the source machine to the destination 
machine, independent of the physical network or networks currently in use. Without the 
transport layer, the whole concept of layered protocols would make little sense.” 
Currently, the dominant communications architecture for wide-area communication is 
TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol).  In TCP/IP’s reference model, the 
Transport layer uses the third, Internet layer to provide a channel of communication between the 
source and destination endpoints. An endpoint cons ists of an IP address, a protocol identifier and 
a port number12. 
 
2.1.1 Mechanisms for Layer 4 Traffic Flow 
 Currently, the two dominant transport layer protocols are TCP/IP’s Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP).  TCP is a reliable, connection-oriented 
protocol. UDP is a connectionless protocol that does not incorporate transmission error checking. 
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TCP13 connections are implemented as point-to-point full-duplex byte streams. The data 
exchange unit, known as a segment, consists of a 20-byte header pre-pended to a variable- length 
segment. 
TCP ensures reliable data transmission using Automatic Repeat Requests (ARQs).  An 
ARQ is an automatic re-transmission of data following a failure to receive a positive 
acknowledgement (ACK) from the receiving host.  
TCP flow control is managed with a ‘Sliding Window’14 protocol. A typical TCP 
implementation supports variable window sizes and the selective-repeat form of sender-initiated 
ARQ. To ensure effective congestion-control, an effort is made to estimate the round-trip 
transmission delay as accurately as possible.  
UDP15 allows transmission of encapsulated raw IP datagrams without the overhead of 
establishing and releasing explicit connections. Since UDP lacks the reliability of TCP, UDP is 
ideal for situations where the rate of delivery is more important than reliable transmission 
without any packet loss. The size of the UDP segment header is 8 bytes.   
 
2.1.1.1    Notion of Ports 
Computers connected to the Internet communicate with each other via endpoints known 
as sockets. A socket address is an identifying number derived from the combination of an IP 
address and a virtual port number. Clearly defined source and destination IP addresses as well as 
source and destination port addresses are the prerequisites for establishing communicating across 
a network. TCP and UDP support 65536 virtual or software ports, each of which is identified by 
a 16-bit number in the range of 0 through 65535. The 48-bit combination of a host’s IPv4 
address and port number is referred to as a Transport Service Access Points or TSAP. The 
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transport layer protocols—TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) as well as UDP (User Datagram 
Protocol)—use these ports to form a virtual channel for information exchange. Any active port 
running a network based service is known as an ‘open’ port. A malicious user can use open ports 
to identify a target system’s attributes, and then use this information as a starting point for 
compromising that host’s security. 
 
2.1.1.2 Standard Uses of Ports 
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)16 associates various applications and 
services with specific port numbers and classifies the entire range of available ports into three 
categories—Well Known Ports, Registered Ports, and Dynamic and/or Private Ports. 
Well-known ports, ports numbered from 0 through 1023, serve as contact addresses for 
various pre-defined services. Usually root privileges are required by the applications that service 
well-known ports. Commonly used ports are 21 (FTP), 22(SSH), 23 (TELNET), 25 (SMTP), 43 
(Who Is), 53(DNS), 80(HTTP), and 137-139 (NETBIOS). A detailed list specifying all well-
known ports and their associated services is available at http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-
numbers. 
Registered ports, ports numbered from 1024 through 49151, serve as the recommended 
ports for various services but are not bound to any particular service. Depending on the 
availability, a host might open a random port in this range to communicate over a network. 
Unlike the well-known ports, registered ports do not require system/root privileges for access. A 
detailed list specifying the Registered Ports and the services associated with them is available at 
the IANA website at http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers. 
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Dynamic ports, ports numbered from 49152 through 65535, are typically used by 
applications that are not registered with the IANA. This range is of extreme significance for a 
system administrator as open ports in this range often indicate the presence of Trojan 
applications on a network host. 
 
2.1.1.2.1 “Trojan” Ports 
Ports typically used by Trojan programs are known as ‘Trojan Ports’. Fixed port numbers 
like TCP port 12345 (NetBus) and UDP port 31337 (Back Orifice) were typically used by earlier 
Trojans.  Newer Trojans such as SubSeven use a wide range of port numbers. Common Trojan 
horse port assignments include 1243 (Sub-7, SubSeven), 6670 (DeepThroat), 6711 (Sub-7, 
SubSeven), 6969 (GateCrasher),  12345 (NetBus), 23456(EvilFtp), 27374(Sub-7, SubSeven), 
30100(NetSphere), 31789 (Hack'a'Tack), and 31337 (BackOrifice). Detailed lists of Trojan ports 
are available at www.doshelp.com/trojanports.htm, http://www.simovits.com/trojans/trojans.html 
and www.commodon.com/threat/threat-ports.htm. 
      
2.1.1.3 Covert Channels of Communication 
One of the most common methods to evade detection is to use covert channels of 
communication. One form of covert channel involves the use of non-standard ports to avoid 
detection. Most Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)17 typically monitor traffic on ports 
associated with standard protocols like DNS, IMAP, POP, SNMP, SYSLOG, TELNET, 
RLOGIN, RSH, FTP, or on ports associated with known backdoors / Trojans. Once a port is 
identified as being associated with malicious code, traffic through that port can be blocked using 
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a firewall. This led to the development of the newer generation of Trojans that dynamically 
choose a port from a pre-defined range.  
A second kind of covert channel, aimed at subverting firewall–based filtering, uses 
standard ports for passing non-standard traffic. Firewalls that enforce a “block-all-but-necessary” 
approach to regulating traffic are the typical targets of standard port abuse. A recent (25 Jan 
2003) case of standard port abuse involved a Denial of Service (DOS) attack that was variously 
known as the ‘SQL Slammer’ worm, ‘Sapphire’ and “SQL-Hell’.  The worm in question used a 
vulnerability in Microsoft SQL Server to subvert targeted systems.  The worm spreads via UDP 
port 1434, which is officially assigned for ‘Microsoft-SQL-Monitor’ services. The infected host 
starts transmitting 376 byte long UDP packets at a very high rate to random IP addresses on the 
Internet thereby generating overwhelming traffic. The attack caused widespread denial of service 
and adversely affected online services throughout the world. 
 
2.1.2    Typical Characteristics of Layer 4 Traffic Flow 
Efficient bandwidth management requires a thorough understanding of layer-4 traffic 
based on actual flows as opposed to simulated flow characteristics. In 1997, Kevin Thompson, 
Gregory Miller and Rick Wilder18 used traffic monitoring tools in MCI’s segment of the Internet 
backbone and the NSF sponsored vBNS to characterize typical layer 4 traffic “in terms of traffic 
volume, flow volume, flow duration, and traffic composition in terms of IP protocols, TCP and 
UDP applications, and packet sizes”. According to their observations,  
(a) TCP traffic accounted for 95% of bytes, 85-95% of packets and 75-85% of the 
flows. The remaining IP traffic was predominantly UDP while ICMP accounted 
for less than 1% of all packets. 
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(b) Average packet size varied over time but followed a 24-hr pattern. 
(c) About 40% of all packets were 40 bytes long indicating TCP ACKs, FINs or 
RSTs. 
(d) Maximum application-based traffic was attributed to HTTP. Other TCP 
applications like FTP, NNTP etc. rarely exceeded 10% of the total traffic. 
(e) For UDP, the maximum traffic varied between DNS traffic and RealPlayer 
services depending on the time of the day. 
  
2.2 Abusing Ports to Compromise Security  
Open ports serve as potential access points for compromising a target host’s security.  
Once a host’s reachability has been verified using a utility like ping, a typical attack attempts to 
identify the target host’ software, as a first step in exploiting known security vulnerabilities19. 
This task of software identification is achieved by mapping open ports to associated services. 
Two common techniques for getting this information include port scanning and fingerprinting.  
 
2.2.1 Port Scanning 
Port scanning is the discovery of open (listening) ports on a target host in order to 
ascertain the operating system and other services and applications running on the host. This 
typically involves scanning for TCP as well as UDP ports. One of the best-known port scanners, 
Fyodor’s nmap20, was used for collecting data for this thesis. A sample screen shot of nmap as 
shown below indicates the capability of this tool. 
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             Figure 2.1: Screenshot of the Windows version of ‘Nmap’ 
 
Various types of common port scanning techniques are described below. 
  
2.2.1.1 TCP Connect Scan 
This is the most fundamental type of scanning and involves the establishment of a TCP 
connection via its three-way handshake. The advantages of TCP connection scanning includes 
speed, in that scans can be done in parallel, and convenience, in that no special system privileges 
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are required for scanning. However this type of scanning is easily detectable and any perimeter-
monitoring device on the target host would eventually block access to the originator of these 
scans. 
 
2.2.1.2  TCP SYN (Half Open) Scan 
SYN scans establish an incomplete connection with the target host. A SYN scan begins 
by sending a SYN packet to a target host.  This packet evokes either a SYN/ACK response (if a 
particular port is open) or a RST response (if that port is closed). If the scanning host receives a 
SYN/ACK, it completes the scan in a non-standard way: i.e., with an RST to the target host, 
which terminates the connection. SYN scanning is therefore also known as "half-open" scanning. 
This technique is harder to detect than TCP connect scanning, but requires root privilege. 
 
2.2.1.3  TCP FIN (Stealth) Scan 
TCP FIN scanning (also known as 'stealth' scanning) was developed to evade detection 
by firewalls and static packet filters that detect TCP SYN scanning. TCP specifications require 
open ports to ignore FIN packets and closed ports to reply to FIN packets with the proper RST. 
However, Microsoft’s TCP stack replies with a RST irrespective of the status of the port. This 
fact enables FIN scanning to differentiate between UNIX and Microsoft implementations.  
 
2.2.1.4  TCP Ftp Proxy (Bounce Attack) Scan 
Ftp proxy scanning exploits a security flaw in the FTP protocol (RFC 959).  Proxy ftp 
connections allow an intruder to connect to an ftp server behind a firewall and execute read-write 
operations. Any port scanning that is done using a proxy ftp server could then bypass the 
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firewall- filtering rules, as the requests now seem to be generated from inside the network. This 
ability to carry out untraceable port scans makes ‘bounce attack’ scanning very attractive to 
potential intruders. The scanner typically connects to an anonymous ftp server and then scans the 
TCP ports from that proxy ftp server. 
 
2.2.1.5  TCP Xmas Tree Scan 
Xmas Tree scans send TCP packets with the FIN, URG and PSH flags set. A response of 
RST from the target host indicates that particular port as closed. No response indicates that the 
port is open and listening. The response can be used as one of the factors in determining the 
target host’s operating system on the basis of established RFC 793—compliance information for 
different stack implementations. 
 
2.2.1.6  TCP Null Scan 
Null scans send TCP packets with none of the flags set identify closed ports on the basis 
of a RST response from the host. RFC 793 specifies that open ports should ignore TCP NULL 
packets. However, certain TCP/IP stack implementations such as IRIX, HP-UX, Cisco IOS, 
MVS and Microsoft Windows are not fully compliant. This lack of full compliance results in 
different response to a TCP NULL scan by different operating systems and can be used for 
fingerprinting. 
 
2.2.1.7  TCP ACK Scan 
TCP ACK scans send TCP ACK packets to a target host. ACK scanning will elicit 
responses from hosts that might have been configured to ignore ICMP pinging. Scans of port 80 
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(HTTP) can identify active web sites that block ICMP echo requests (pings): an open port will 
elicit a RST response. This type of scanning is slightly different in that it seeks to determine 
whether the firewall protecting the target host is based on simple rules or employs advanced 
packet filtering techniques. 
 
2.2.1.8 TCP Windows Scan 
This technique seeks to identify open ports on a target system based on a system’s 
window size characteristics. This exploits an anomaly in the AIX and FreeBSD systems in 
reporting the TCP window size. Depending on the operating system of the target host, the TCP 
windows scan might yield information about the status of certain filtered as well as non-filtered 
ports. 
 
2.2.1.9 TCP RPC Scan 
Sun Microsystems’ RPC (Remote Procedure Call) mechanism simplifies distributed 
client-server computing by allowing network communications to be framed as subroutine calls. 
The ports designated for RPC start at port number 32678. TCP RPC scans detect and identify 
ports being used by Remote Procedure Call services. This scanning technique also provides 
information on the version number and programs associated with the RPC services running on a 
target host. 
 
2.2.1.10 SYN / FIN Scan Using IP Fragments (Bypass Packet Filters) 
SYN/FIN scans fragment probe packets before sending them, in an attempt to avoid 
detection by firewalls and packet filters. The TCP header is fragmented over a number of packets 
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to bypass the filtering mechanism. While this approach works with many firewalls, it will not 
work against systems that queue all IP fragments and reassemble the incoming packets thus 
identifying the active status of the SYN / FIN flags. 
 
2.2.1.11 UDP Recvfrom() And Write() Scan 
Users without root access to a scanning platform can recvfrom() and write() scans to 
identify open ports on some target hosts.  The Linux UDP stack responds to an unsolicited 
readfrom() with error number 13 (EAGAIN-"try again") and error number 111 
(ECONNREFUSED- "Connection refused"), according to whether the targeted port is open or 
closed. 
 
2.2.1.12  UDP Raw ICMP Port Unreachable Scan 
Raw ICMP port unreachable scans are similar to TCP bounce attack scanning, but target 
the UDP protocol. The scan attempts to distinguish between closed and open ports by treating an 
ICMP_PORT_UNREACH error message as a response from a closed port, and no response as an 
indicator of an open port. However, this technique is not very reliable, as some UDP stack 
implementations don't respond to either. Root privilege is required for initiating UDP ICMP port 
unreachable scanning. 
 
2.2.1.13  ICMP Echo Scan (Ping – Sweep) 
Strictly speaking, ICMP Echo Scanning is not a port scanning technique, in that ICMP 
does not support ports. This technique seeks to determine the active hosts by using the ICMP 
echo request (ping) command. An ICMP echo reply message (type value = 0; code value = 0) in 
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response to an ICMP echo request message (type value = 8; code value = 0) indicates that the 
target host is alive and that the ICMP messages are not being filtered. A number of port scanners 
now support parallel ICMP scanning, making the process of scanning an entire network or a 
range of hosts time-efficient. Nmap supports non-blocking I/O and parallel scanning in all TCP 
and UDP modes. 
 
2.2.1.14  Reverse-ident Scan 
This technique uses TCP’s ident protocol (RFC 1413) to determine the owner of an open 
port’s server process. Unlike the fragmentation scans, the TCP reverse ident scan requires a 
complete TCP connection with the target port. Potential attackers can use this feature to 
determine if a port is being serviced by a task with root privileges—and, if so, the task’s 
associated account. The user name thus determined can be used for getting more information 
about the network. 
 
2.2.1.15 Idle Scan 
Idle scanning is a highly sophisticated port scanning technique invented by Antirez22. In 
idle scanning, the attacker sends probes from a ‘dumb’ host; thereby giving a fictitious IP 
address to any Intrusion Detection System that detects the scanning. Because of its high stealth 
capability, it is also known as “blind port scanning”. Idle scanning can additionally be used to 
establish IP-based share relationships between trusted hosts on a network. 
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2.2.2 Stack Fingerprinting 
According to Stuart McClure, Joel Scambray and George Kurtz23, “stack fingerprinting is 
an extremely powerful technology for ascertaining each host’s operating system with a high 
degree of probability”. Stack fingerprinting uses differences between vendor implementations of 
TCP/IP stacks to identify target host software. Stack fingerprinting can be active or passive. 
 
2.2.2.1 Active Stack Fingerprinting  
In active stack fingerprinting, an attacker probes a target host’s open ports, then compares 
the responses to a database of known ‘signature-behavior mappings’ to profile the target host. 
According to McClure et al, active stack fingerprinting can be achieved by using the various 
types of probes listed below: 
 
2.2.2.1.1 FIN Probe 
FIN probes were discussed above, in Section 2.2.1.3. 
 
2.2.2.1.2 Bogus Flag Probe  
Bogus flag probes monitor the response to a SYN packet with an undefined TCP flag set 
(bit 7 or 8) in the header. Some operating systems reset the connection on receiving a TCP 
packet with bogus flags set; others, like older Linux versions (ver. 2.0.35 and earlier) responded 
by mirroring the bogus flags in their response packet headers. Of late, however, the 8th bit is 
being used for the “ECN field” for TCP congestion control. The port scanner “Queso” was one 
of the first scanners to exploit this technique for OS-determination. 
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2.2.2.1.3 Initial Sequence Number (ISN) Sampling 
ISN sampling looks for patterns in the initial sequence numbers (ISNs) from target hosts. 
Operating systems may be identified on the basis of the sampling pattern of the response. Some 
known patterns along with their associated stack implementations are placed in table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: ISN sampling pattern Vs Stack implementation 
# Sampling Pattern Stack Implementation 
1 Traditional 64K SCO Unix (and most earlier versions of Unix) 
2 Random 
incremental 
FreeBSD, Digital UNIX, Cray, Solaris, IRIX, and newer versions of 
Unix 
3 True "random" Linux 2.0.*, OpenVMS, newer AIX 
4 Time dependent  Microsoft Windows 
5 Constant Apple LaserWriter printers and 3Com hubs 
 
 
2.2.2.1.4 “Don’t Fragment Bit” Monitoring 
Certain operating systems such as Solaris set the “don’t fragment bit” on the IP packets 
that they transmit. Different stack implementations handle this bit differently. The setting of this 
bit is monitored and compared with a known database to aid estimation of the target operating 
system. 
 
2.2.2.1.5 TCP Initial Window Size  
Certain operating system stacks implement unique initial window sizes and this can be 
used as a signature attribute. While Microsoft Windows 2000, FreeBSD and OpenBSD use 
0x402E; AIX uses 0x3F25. The initial TCP window size of the returned packets can thus help in 
OS determination of the target host. 
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2.2.2.1.6 ACK Value 
ACK Value probing examines ACK field sequence values, yet another signature 
attribute. On sending a TCP packet with the FIN, PSH, and URG flags set to a closed port, 
Microsoft Windows will send an ACK with the initial sequence number incremented by one 
whereas most Unix-based operating systems will send an ACK with the same ISN set as the 
probe packet. On sending a TCP packet with the SYN, FIN, PSH, and URG flags set to an open 
port, Microsoft Windows will respond with an ACK packet with a random value for the ISN. 
 
2.2.2.1.7 ICMP Error Message Quenching 
Some operating systems such as Linux limit the generation of error messages (e.g. 
destination unreachable message) in accordance with the recommendations of RFC 1812. The 
ICMP error message quenching scan involves sending UDP packets on random ports and 
inferring the identity of the target’s host stack from the number of unreachable messages in a 
given time period. 
 
2.2.2.1.8 ICMP Message Quoting 
In accordance with the recommendations of the various RFCs, ICMP error messages 
contain part information regarding the error-causing packet. While most stack implementations 
send 8 additional bytes along with the IP header, Solaris and Linux typically return more 
information.  ICMP error message quoting infers operating system identity from the diagnostic 
returned in response to an ICMP error as an estimation attribute. Using known responses to 
various errors, it might be possible to detect hosts running Linux as well as Solaris systems even 
if all their ports are closed. 
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2.2.2.1.9 ICMP Error Message -Echoing Integrity 
Echo integrity probing checks for changes to scanner-generated IP headers that are 
returned from the target host, in ICMP error messages. Many stack implementations 
inadvertently modify the packet header while processing them. Comparing the alterations made 
with an existing database of ‘alteration-signatures’ can pinpoint the target operating system with 
accuracy. Some commonly known alterations are tabulated in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Alterations to packet headers made by various operating systems 
# Characteristics of returned header Operating system 
1 Alterations to the IP ID BSDI, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, ULTRIX, and VAXen 
2 Checksum errors AIX and FreeBSD 
3 'Total length' field is 20 bytes longer 
than normal 
AIX and BSDI 
 
2.2.2.1.10 Type of Service (TOS) 
The value in the TOS returned for “ICMP port unreachable” messages might vary for 
different stack implementations. While most implementations return ‘0’ for ICMP port 
unreachable messages, Linux returns a value of ‘0xC0’. 
 
2.2.2.1.11 Fragmentation Handling 
Different operating systems handle overlapping fragments of IP packets differently. The 
reassembled packets can give information about the reassembly process used. Fragmentation 
handling involves examining the method of reassembling of the probe packet- fragments to 
estimate the stack implementation.  
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2.2.2.1.12 TCP Options  
TCP options probing checks how target systems manage requests for “custom” TCP 
options, like window scale factor, timestamps, maximum segment size, no operation, and end of 
operation. (cf. RFC 793 and RFC 1323).  These options, which are not mandatory as per the 
RFC, are only implemented by some TCP/IP stacks. 
 
2.2.2.2   Passive Stack Fingerprinting  
In passive fingerprinting, the attacker maps ports without specifically probing the target 
host. The target machine’s TCP/IP stack is reconnoitered by observing TCP/IP session attributes 
like TTL, ‘Don’t fragment’ bits, and window size. Passive fingerprinting, though not as accurate 
as active fingerprinting, is more difficult to detect. 
 
2.3 Techniques for Detecting Invalid Use of Ports 
 Port abuse is detected by identifying malicious actions and abnormal behavior that might 
compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information resources. The various 
techniques can broadly be classified as use analysis, bandwidth analysis, content analysis and 
timing analysis. 
 
2.3.1 Use Analysis 
Use analysis checks for port abuse by monitoring the numbers of the actual ports in use. 
Services known to be associated with distinctive port numbers can be identified using a pre-
established database to map services to port numbers. Commonly used tools for this technique 
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include “netstat” as well as “Active Ports”. A sample screen shot of Active Ports listing all open 
ports on a host is given below: 
         Fig 2.2: Screen shot of ‘Active Ports’ showing all open ports on a system. 
Rigorous logging and analysis of all remote-connection attempts is another way of 
detecting potential attacks. 
 
2.3.2 Bandwidth Analysis 
 Bandwidth analysis is an important technique for identifying abnormal network usage. 
Packeteer Inc.’s ‘PacketShaper’ was used extensively to collect data for this thesis. PacketShaper 
allows application adaptive real time monitoring of network traffic and gives the ability to 
monitor/filter traffic on a port-to-port basis. A detailed account of the packet shaper is given in 
section 3. A sample screen shot depicting application-based monitoring using Packet Shaper is 
shown below: 
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Fig 2.3: Screen shot depicting application-based monitoring of traffic 
 
2.3.3 Content Analysis 
    Invalid port use can be detected by analyzing the content of the IP packets being 
transmitted on a network. This approach is useful to detect covert information exchange when 
malicious programs use well-known ports to pass non-standard data thereby subverting firewalls. 
Commonly used strategies for content analysis include network protocol analysis (or packet 
sniffing) and intrusion detection. A well-known protocol analyzer, ‘Ethereal’, was used for 
collecting data for this thesis. Sample output from Ethereal is shown below: 
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Fig 2.4: Screen shot showing ‘packet sniffing’ in action with detailed information                             
about captured data from the ETSU network. 
 
A detailed protocol hierarchy breakdown of the captured data is shown below in yet 
another screen shot from Ethereal. 
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Fig 2.5: Protocol Hierarchy Breakdown 
 
2.3.3.1 Real Time Intrusion Detection 
Real time intrusion detection26 systems such as Vern Paxon’s ‘Bro’ can effectively 
defend against overload, crash as well as subterfuge attacks against the network host. Bro 
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consists of an event engine that converts a stream of filtered packets to high- level network 
events, and an interpreter for a specialized language for writing the security policy.  
 Bro has a layered structure. Its lowest layer, libpcap, is the packet capture directory used 
by the tcpdump protocol analyzer utility. This layer isolates Bro from the network link 
technology and enhances Bro’s portability. The filtered packet stream from libpcap is passed to 
the event engine, which is the next layer. The event engine confirms the integrity of packet 
headers. All packets failing this check are discarded. Packets passing the integrity check are sent 
for further processing in separate streams for TCP and UDP packets. The processing involves 
invoking a handler to process the data payload of the packet. The processed event stream is then 
passed to the policy script interpreter, which generates a real-time notification of intrusions.  Bro 
is specifically designed to handle high speed (FDDI–rate) large volume monitoring with an 
emphasis on extensibility and on avoiding packet filter drops. 
 
2.3.3.1.1 Overload, Crash and Subterfuge Attacks 
Depending on the events generated by the event engine’s processing of a data packet, Bro 
executes event-handler commands until the queue is empty. Paxson claims that Bro has been 
designed to survive overload, crash and subterfuge attacks against the network monitor.  
An overload attack first overwhelms the monitor with excessive data to ensure that it is 
unable to keep with the data stream. The actual network intrusion starts after the monitor has 
been overwhelmed. As long as the attacker doesn’t have access to the policy scripts, Bro 
provides reasonable defense against overload attacks. 
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A crash attack incapacitates the monitor by exhausting its resources. The actual network 
intrusion takes place after the monitor has been rendered useless. Bro has been provided with 
specific capability to avoid crash attacks. 
A subterfuge attack  depends on the attacker’s ability to mislead the network monitor 
regarding the nature of the traffic it analyses. The nature of these attacks makes it extremely 
difficult to detect or prevent subterfuge attacks. Successful subterfuge attacks rely on modifying 
the traffic pattern in a manner that renders the traffic stream open to different interpretations by 
the network monitor and the intended recipient. To protect against subterfuge attacks, Bro 
analyzes a system’s rules for classifying network content for flawed assumptions. Paxson gives 
the example of texts embedded with a NUL to persuade the network monitor to ignore data 
thereafter and fragmenting the IP datagrams in a manner that might not be reassembled correctly 
by the monitoring device. Paxson claims that this equips Bro with a formidable intrusion 
detection capability while admitting that it still doesn’t provide absolute security. 
 
2.3.3.2 Traffic Normalization 
Bro, which has its strengths, can unfortunately be bypassed by exploiting ambiguities in 
the network traffic stream. In “Network Intrusion Detection: Evasion, Traffic Normalization, and 
End-to-End Protocol Semantics”, Handley27, Paxson, and Kreibich describe the use of a network-
forwarding element called a traffic normalizer to eliminate the traffic ambiguities by ‘patching-
up’ or ‘normalizing’ the packet stream. Normalizers are similar to protocol scrubbers28 but cover 
a wider range of conditions, and are optimized to defend coordinated attacks against the 
normalizers themselves. 
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2.3.3.3 Intrusion Detection Wrappers  
In “Detecting and Countering System Intrusions Using Software Wrappers”, Ko29, 
Fraser, Badger and Kilpatrick suggest the use of ID wrappers, in conjunction with intrusion 
detection techniques, to intercept problem events and take countermeasures if an event suggests 
the possibility of an intrusion. According to these authors, “an ID wrapper is a software layer 
dynamically inserted into the kernel that can selectively intercept and analyze system calls 
performed by processes as well as respond to intrusive events”.   
ID wrappers facilitate program monitoring to detect unauthorized modifications that 
might be overlooked by traditional audit mechanisms. Wrapper countermeasures include denial, 
transformation or augmentation of the event. ID wrappers may also generate specialized events 
that would be intercepted by other intrusion detection wrappers in the system. The various ID 
wrappers are configured and managed by the ‘wrapper support subsystem’. Multiple ID 
wrappers can be used in a layered composition for more effective intrusion detection. The 
‘Common Intrusion Detection Framework’ uses multiple ID wrappers to enhance performance. 
 
2.3.3.4 Intrusion Detection Based on Expert Systems  
Expert systems depend on extensive knowledge bases and sophisticated IF-THEN-ELSE 
rule sets. Depending on the status of critical events, they are designed to initiate actions in 
conformance to their driving rule sets. Ulf Lindqvist and Phillip A Porras30 have described the 
use of PBEST (Production Based Expert System Toolset)—an expert system development 
toolset to develop a generic signature based IDS specifically for detecting SYN flooding and 
buffer overflows.  
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2.3.3.5 Intrusion Prevention 
The ability to detect and isolate attacks before they compromise a system’s core 
functionality is a prerequisite for building systems capable of surviving directed attacks. 
Intrusion prevention, as described by R. Sekar31 and P. Uppuluri, uses patterns of system calls to 
monitor and disallow calls that deviate from specifications. Since a potentially damaging system 
call can be modified before the damage is done, this technique gives the system time to prevent 
the damage. 
Sekar and Uppuluri’s intrusion prevent ion system consists of an offline and a runtime 
component. The offline system generates detection engines from specifications characterizing 
normal and abnormal program behavior as patterns of system call sequences, and the runtime 
system provides the execution environment for these engines. The authors claim that their 
algorithm, whose runtime is almost independent of the number of patterns, is suitable for any 
intrusion detection method involving pattern matching.  
 
2.3.4 Timing Analysis 
Yin Zhang32 and Vern Paxson, in “Detecting Backdoors”, describe a generalized timing-
based algorithm for detecting interactive network traffic using non-standard ports. The 
algorithm’s goal is to detect the use of such ports to facilitate re-entry into systems that have 
already been breached.  The authors use a timing-based algorithm instead of a content-based 
algorithm to render their work insensitive to encryption and decryption, and to reduce the 
algorithm’s overhead. The algorithm accounts for packet size and directionality and the packet 
inter-arrival timing. The directionality helps in filtering the network traffic based on the premise 
that an interactive connection is always initiated by the client.  
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A high frequency of false alarms generated by this generalized algorithm prompted 
Zhang and Paxson to develop fifteen protocol-specific algorithms that detect backdoors on the 
basis of protocol-specific signatures. Depending upon the protocols or services used, the authors 
have classified the backdoors into various types—viz., SSH, Rlogin, Telnet, FTP, Root prompt, 
Napster and Gnutella—and developed specific algorithms to deal with each type.  
 
2.4 Techniques for Blocking Invalid Use of “Mainstream” Ports 
Authors like John E Canavan33, Rolf Oppliger34, Chris Benton and Cameron Hunt35 
identify a variety of techniques for blocking undesirable traffic. Nine of the more important of 
these techniques are discussed below. 
 
2.4.1  Shutting Down Unneeded Services 
 Shutting down unneeded services is the simplest and most basic technique for preventing 
port abuse. Since open ports are potential access points on the network, care should be taken to 
disable all unnecessary services thereby closing all unnecessary ports on the host. Though this 
technique is the simplest to implement, it fails to provide a reasonable level of security as 
malicious programs target commonly used ports for compromising a target host’s security. 
 
2.4.2 Port Re-Mapping 
 Port re-mapping involves running important services on non-standard ports thereby 
increasing the degree of difficulty involved in compromising such a system. This technique is 
effective only against ‘script-kiddies’ as experienced and dedicated hackers are generally able to 
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figure out if certain services are running on non-standard ports. If port re-mapping is not done 
properly, it might actually increase the system’s vulnerability as new ports are opened.  
 
2.4.3 Static Packet Filtering 
 Static packet filtering involves filtering incoming as well as outgoing data packets on the 
basis of the header information. The packets are denied or allowed access depending on the 
access control policies defined for the system. Static filtering controls traffic flow by analyzing 
information such as the source and destination IP address or subnet, the source and destination 
port addresses and the TCP flag field. This technique is difficult to implement for controlling 
UDP traffic, as the UDP header does not use flags to indicate a session's state. 
 
2.4.4 Dynamic Packet Filtering 
 Dynamic packet filtering enhances static packet filtering by controlling traffic based on 
packet attributes as well as connection-state monitoring. Unlike static filtering which can only 
provide protection against a TCP SYN scan attack, dynamic packet filtering provides protection 
against TCP ACK scan as well as TCP FIN scan attacks. Dynamic packet filtering is also 
referred to as "intelligent filtering”. This technique can also handle traffic-control effortlessly 
with UDP traffic, as it no longer relies on the UDP header for session-state information. 
 
2.4.5 Stateful Filtering 
  Stateful filtering, an advanced filtering technique, tracks session context in addition to 
session state. Stateful filtering involves analyzing individual data packets in the traffic flow and 
monitoring information regarding the application protocol in addition to the contents of the 
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packet header and payload. The term ‘stateful’ signifies the ability to remember the connection 
status. Also known as "Stateful Multilevel Inspection", this allows protocol-specific monitoring 
of even connectionless protocols like UDP, NFS and RPC.  
 
2.4.6 Proxy Filtering 
Proxy filtering uses proxy servers or application gateways to act as mediators between 
the source and the destination systems. Since all communication between the two hosts is  
controlled, this provides a simple and effective defense against port abuse. 
 
2.4.7 Plug Gateways 
Plug gateways use stripped-down proxies that are not application-specific. They allow 
connectivity for specified ports and the traffic control is based on the principle of dynamic 
packet filtering. 
 
2.4.8 Port Address Translation 
 Port address translation routes incoming packets to pre-defined private IP addresses on 
the local network based on the port number-service mapping. This strategy can be used to foil 
specific port-based attacks. 
 
2.4.9 Traffic Management 
 Traffic management, also known as bandwidth management, helps in identifying traffic 
on a port-by-port basis and allows implementation of policies to detect and control port abuse. 
Not only can traffic be denied to specific ports but the acceptable volume of traffic can also be 
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specified for any port. Traffic management can also be achieved by regulating traffic flow on the 
basis of applications or protocols. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BANDWIDTH MANAGEMENT 
 
This section of the thesis is broadly divided into three subsections—Goals, Preliminaries, 
and Bandwidth Management. While the first subsection is a formal statement of the goals of this 
thesis, the second subsection deals with the infrastructure issues associated with the tools used 
for conducting the research. The third subsection describes the methodology followed and 
lessons learnt.  
 
3.1 Goals   
The goal of this thesis was to study bandwidth management techniques. This thesis 
describes the lessons learnt as part of this study. The task involved was divided into two subtasks 
with the following goals: 
(a) Identify and minimize the use of excessive bandwidth by non-critical and undesirable 
applications (application-adaptive strategy) 
 (b) Monitor bandwidth use to minimize port abuse and flow of malicious data (rogue 
traffic on legitimate ports) 
 
3.2 Preliminaries 
This section, which deals with the preliminaries, is divided into three subsections—
‘Background study’, ‘Data Collection Tools’ and ‘Monitoring Station’. While the first part gives 
a brief overview of the background study, the second part describes the various tools used for 
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data collection along with the rationale for their selection. The third part deals with the network 
configuration aspects of the traffic monitoring station and the PacketShaper settings. 
 
3.2.1 Background study 
The primary sources for the background study were the websites, 
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/cs and http://www.sans.org and ACM and USENIX journals. Other 
frequently visited security related web sites included http://www.neohapsis.com, 
http://www.dshield.org, http://www.insecure.org, http://www.securityfocus.com, and 
http://www.incidents.org. While work has been done in the field of Quality of Service (QOS) 
and network bandwidth management based on traffic classification, no study was found that 
concentrated on application adaptive bandwidth management or that measured desirable vs. 
undesirable bandwidth in a university setting. Most professional organizations have a clearly 
defined set of “topics of professional interest”. However, a university setting is unique in the 
sense that given the wide variety of courses taught, the topics of “professional interest” cover 
almost everything, thus making it difficult to clearly classify traffic into ‘desirable’ and 
‘undesirable’ parts based only on the topic content. Also, a typical university network is more 
prone to exploitation by students using P2P file swapping services and other applications that 
subject the network to a considerable risk of Trojans and other malicious code. 
 
3.2.2 Data Collection Tools 
Data collection for the current thesis involved the use of various tools such as the 
PacketShaper system, PacketPup, Network Probe, Ethereal, Active Ports and the Action Request 
System software. The selection of the tools was influenced by financial considerations. In the 
absence of any specially allotted funds, an effort was made to optimally use the existing 
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infrastructure. While PacketShaper and the Action Request System were part of ETSU’s existing 
infrastructure, all the other tools used were freeware, thereby keeping the budgetary overheads to 
a bare minimum. 
  
3.2.2.1 PacketShaper 
Packeteer’s PacketShaper system consists of a combination of hardware and software 
components. ETSU has the PacketShaper 2500 hardware console and the associated software 
version presently being used is 5.3. PacketShaper supports application-adaptive bandwidth 
management across enterprise WANs and can be used for controlling inbound as well as 
outbound traffic. As part of this thesis, the PacketShaper tool was used extensively to monitor 
and analyze bandwidth utilization on the campus network.  The PacketShaper client, being web–
based, is platform independent. PacketShaper is used actively by OIT for assuring quality of 
service to the network users. The policies are regularly reviewed since requirements often change 
with the discovery of new threats and vulnerabilities. Findings of this thesis served as an input 
parameter for the choice of strategy adopted while using the PacketShaper. 
 
 3.2.2.2   Active Ports  
SmartLine Inc’s Active Ports version 1.4 is a freeware tool designed for the Windows 
NT/2000/XP platform. It was used extensively to monitor all open TCP and UDP ports on the 
local host. Active Ports displays all active connections on the host along with the IP addresses 
and port numbers of both the connection endpoints. It also facilitates monitoring applications on 
the basis of that application’s associated ports. This helps in identifying open ports associated 
with Trojans or other vulnerabilities and allows its user to terminate suspect processes.  
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3.2.2.3 PacketPup  
Palisade systems’ PacketPup version 2.2 is a limited-time freeware trial package. 
PacketPup is a bandwidth-monitoring tool that aids in detecting P-2-P file-sharing or streaming 
media traffic on the network. PacketPup’s biggest drawback is its lack of support for controlling 
traffic. PacketPup was used to verify the classification-effectiveness of PacketShaper. 
 
3.2.2.4 Network Probe 0.4 
Network Probe version 0.4 from Object Planet is a freeware protocol analyzer and 
network traffic monitoring tool.  Network Probe was used to identify and track rogue traffic in 
real-time, and to obtain information about the network interface cards (NICs) of the 
communicating hosts. A sample screen shot depicting real-time network analysis using Network 
Probe is shown in figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1: Network Probe in Action 
 
3.2.2.5 Ethereal  
Ethereal is a free network protocol analyzer for the Unix and Windows platforms. 
Ethereal version 0.9.7 was used to monitor network traffic in real time to identify rogue and 
undesirable traffic streams. Ethereal allows access to detailed traffic information on a packet-by-
packet level. It was used extensively to reconstruct the traffic stream for different TCP sessions 
to allow a detailed investigation of the traffic contents. Ethereal’s cost, together with its broad 
support for a wide variety of hardware and software platforms, cross-platform compatibility of 
data files and its powerful network analysis capabilities made it the protocol analyzer of choice 
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for this thesis. At present Ethereal claims to be able to successfully “dissect” 366 protocols. A 
detailed list of these protocols is given in Appendix A. 
 
3.2.2.6 Action Request System  
The Action Request System (ARS) is a Service Management utility marketed by Remedy 
Corporation. OIT uses ARS version 4.05.02 for managing its helpdesk services and inventory 
management functions. ARS was used in this work to help identify the various hosts on the 
campus network. 
 
3.2.2.7 McAfee’s GroupShield Exchange 5.0 Enterprise Suite  
GroupShield Exchange 5.0 Enterprise Suite consists of three components. The first, 
GroupShield, is a network based content filtering and anti-virus package with built in support for 
Microsoft’s Virus Scanning API. The second, ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO), facilitates centralized 
protection from malicious threats that include known exploits and malicious scripts aimed at 
subverting a network.  The last, Outbreak Manager contains outbreaks of new viruses by 
monitoring network activity for malicious outbreak patterns. 
 
3.2.3 Monitoring station 
A monitoring station was set up for primary data collection at the OIT data center in 
Lucille Clement Hall. The station consisted of two computers at different topological positions 
on the ETSU network. One, a Windows 2000 platform, served as a network normal host. The 
other, a Redhat Linux 8.2 box positioned outside the firewall and the packet-shaper, afforded 
access to the entire incoming network traffic before it encountered any perimeter access control 
or security device. I had started with two different operating systems to allow flexibility in 
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selecting the best possible tools. This monitoring port is represented by a ‘star’ symbol as shown 
in Figure 3.2, depicting a part of the ETSU network’s topology.   
A brief summary of PacketShaper settings is given below: 
Table 3.1: Summary of PacketShaper settings 
Non-sharable (local) settings: Sharable settings: 
  IP address:             151.141.95.3 Site router:              151.141.95.2 
  Subnet mask:          255.255.255.0 Link speed:             9264k 
  Gateway:               151.141.95.1 Packet shaping:       on 
  DNS server(s):       151.141.8.100 Traffic discovery:   on 
  Default domain:      etsu.edu Automatic policy:  off 
  Inside nic speed:     100BaseT full-duplex  
  Outside nic speed:  100BaseT full-duplex  
 
 
3.3 Bandwidth Management 
Section 3.3 describes the methodology for achieving real-time bandwidth management. 
The process was divided into three distinct stages—classification of the network traffic, analysis 
and interpretation of the classified traffic, and enforcement of management policies. 
 
3.3.1 Classification of the Network Traffic 
A detailed analysis of the network traffic is a prerequisite for achieving efficient 
bandwidth management. To aid this analysis, the entire network traffic was classified in real 
time, using PacketShaper, into distinct categories or classes. The classification was achieved 
using 'matching rules' to identify different types of traffic in the network stream. Depending on 
requirements, the matching rules were configured to classify data on the basis of, port number, 
protocol family, application / service, and web attributes.  When a certain traffic flow satisfied a 
particular matching rule, a corresponding entry was added to the classification tree. A typical 
hierarchical traffic tree depicting the various classes is shown in the figure 3.3. 
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Sprint North: ISP 
TNII-2600: Connection to the Tennessee Information Infrastructure (service provider for             
Tennessee state organizations). 
       :  Monitoring Station 
LCH-525: Cisco PIX 525 Firewall 
Shaper: Packeteer’s PacketShaper 2500 Hardware console. 
 
Figure 3.2: Position of the Monitoring Station 
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Figure 3.3: Typical Hierarchical Network Traffic Classification Tree 
 
Port-based classification classifies Layer 4 traffic by port number or port number range. 
The use of ranges helps in identifying and restricting traffic directed at undesirable port numbers. 
It also helps in measuring the volume of traffic directed at commonly used well-known ports. 
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Protocol based classification classifies traffic by protocol type. PacketShaper36 supports 
traffic classification based on transport protocol (viz. TCP and UDP) as well as protocol family, 
such as IP, SNA, Net BIOS, AppleTalk, and IPX etc. This classification was of tremendous 
value for managing bandwidth on the basis of protocols used.  
Application-adaptive classification uses Layer 7 application signatures to identify a 
communication’s participating applications.  While protocol-based and port-based traffic 
classification is helpful for standard applications using static-port assignments, the strategy falls 
short for applications using non-standard ports or dynamically negotiated ports.  This sort of 
tracking is supported by PacketShaper's ability to track traffic with migrating port-assignments, 
and to use application-specific identifier to different iate among applications using the same port 
number. Examples of applications using dynamically negotiable ports include passive FTP, AOL 
instant messaging, and peer-to-peer file sharing applications like KaZaA, Gnutella, and Napster. 
Another example of application-adaptive classification for applications using the same port (port 
# 23) include differentiating traffic streams for TN3270 and TN5250 data from other Telnet 
traffic. Application-adaptive classification can also isolate different types of traffic for a single 
application based on different matching rules. This application sub-classification allows 
separation of Oracle netv2 traffic based on version (Oracle 7 Vs Oracle 8i/9i), as well as 
participating database. Similarly VoIP data can be sub-classified based on CODEC. Packeteer 
claims that PacketShaper can classify more than 150 types of traffic streams. A complete list of 
applications, protocols and services classified37 by PacketShaper is placed in Appendix B. 
Web Classification was motivated by the initial indication that Web-directed HTTP 
traffic consumed the bulk of ETSU’s network bandwidth.  In order to differentiate desirable and 
undesirable traffic, various identifying attributes such as IP addresses, subnets, URLs, server 
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location, mime type, HTTP tunnel, and traffic direction (inbound vs. outbound) were used for 
finer classification. This facilitated identification of mission-critical traffic from entertainment-
oriented media traffic using HTTP. Streaming media data uses the real-time protocol (RTP), 
which uses various identifying attributes such as the media type (audio vs. video), the encoding 
name and the clock rate. With the help of these identifying attributes, a very fine classification of 
the network traffic is possible.  
 
3.3.2 Analysis and Interpretation 
An initial traffic analysis of the ETSU network, conducted in August 2002, was used to 
identify the top ten types of consumers of ETSU network bandwidth, relative to average flow, 
peak flow, and total volume of traffic. Network traffic trends were monitored on almost a daily 
(except weekends) basis. Any knowledge of new vulnerabilities or increased network transaction 
delays prompted an analysis of host-level bandwidth usage for the affected traffic class.  The 
host analysis thus formed a secondary step used for precision-tuning the bandwidth allocation. 
The top talkers (originators of network traffic) and listeners (recipients of network traffic) were 
identified over different time intervals. Sample data showing the DNS name, IP address and 
percentage bandwidth usage for the top users of outbound FTP and the pcAnywhere remote 
monitoring application is shown in tables 3.2 through 3.5. 
 
Table 3.2: Top sending IP hosts in class /Outbound/Low/FTP 
 
Top Talkers  
 DNS Name  IP Address Usage 
1 infoserv 151.141.8.184 26% 
2 ftp 151.141.8.164 11% 
3 antivirus 151.141.8.167 5% 
4 techweb 151.141.48.21 5% 
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5 webserv 151.141.8.154 3% 
6 casanetn 151.141.8.172 3% 
7 cscidbw 151.141.30.36 2% 
8 ats 151.141.30.127 <1% 
9 qcom 151.141.8.171 <1% 
10 Server refused request 151.141.56.101 <1% 
 
Table 3.3: Top receiving IP hosts in class /Outbound/Low/FTP 
Top Listeners  
 DNS Name  IP Address Usage 
1 No such name 216.145.70.254 9% 
2 ool-182f71d9.dyn.optonline.net 24.47.113.217 <1% 
3 62-101-125-229.fastres.net 62.101.125.229 <1% 
4 pcp03046746pcs.grey01.tn.comcast.net 68.62.247.7 <1% 
5 No such name 205.227.136.41 <1% 
6 jc-c-24-158-136-55.chartertn.net 24.158.136.55 <1% 
7 hosting.web-axis.net 216.127.80.46 <1% 
8 morristown-68-118-102-92.chartertn.net 68.118.102.92 <1% 
9 No such name 161.69.201.238 <1% 
10 No such name 161.69.201.237 <1% 
 
Table 3.4: Top sending IP hosts in class /Outbound/Average/pcANYWHERE 
 
Top Talkers  
 DNS Name  IP Address Usage 
1 yan 151.141.55.207 83% 
2 krish 151.141.55.172 13% 
3 housing 151.141.8.177 <1% 
4 blackboard 151.141.8.51 <1% 
5 einstein 151.141.30.144 <1% 
6 Server refused request 151.141.28.215 <1% 
7 etsu81240 151.141.55.159 <1% 
8 etsu82375 151.141.60.233 <1% 
9 wrl-voyager 151.141.112.103 <1% 
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Table 3.5: Top receiving IP hosts in class /Outbound/Average/pcANYWHERE 
Top Listeners  
 DNS Name  IP Address Usage 
1 p50862209.dip0.t- ipconnect.de 80.134.34.9 <1% 
2 acaen-105-1-6-114.abo.wanadoo.fr 81.48.27.114 <1% 
3 host241-107.pool80117.interbusiness.it 80.117.107.241 <1% 
4 pd9e3d083.dip.t-dialin.net 217.227.208.131 <1% 
5 host157-174.pool80116.interbusiness.it 80.116.174.157 <1% 
6 213-208-104-231.dyn.gotadsl.co.uk 213.208.104.231 <1% 
7 pd9e7e1ec.dip.t-dialin.net 217.231.225.236 <1% 
8 198.knoxville-05rh16rt-ca.dial-access.att.net 12.93.225.198 <1% 
9 42.knoxville-04rh15rt-ca.dial-access.att.net 12.93.222.42 <1% 
10 No such name 209.126.214.41 <1% 
 
3.3.3 Enforcement of Management Policies 
Management strategies used included implementation of application-based traffic flow 
policies. These policies allowed assured levels of bandwidth for desirable traffic, while 
restricting undesirable traffic flows. The various policy types employed were priority, flow rate, 
discard, and ignore. 
Priority policies were used to assign priority levels for various traffic classes. 
PacketShaper priorities range from 0 (minimum priority) to 7 (maximum priority) with a default 
of 3. Assigning priority policies are most suitable for non-continuous or short, unpredictable, 
non-IP traffic such as RADIUS authentication, Telnet, and DNS queries. 
Flow rate policies were used to assign a minimum acceptable flow-rate for specific 
traffic classes. Using the 'burstable at priority' feature of flow rate policies grants applications 
higher-than-minimum assigned bandwidth subject to availability. If all assigned classes already 
have their minimum flow rate and more bandwidth is available, then individual class-priority 
becomes the deciding factor for distribution of excess bandwidth. Flow rate policies also allow 
the setting of a limit on the maximum acceptable bandwidth for different traffic classes. Flow 
rate policies are most suitable for bursty IP-based traffic such as FTP and HTTP as well as for 
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latency-sensitive applications such as Voice over IP. These policies were implemented using 
PacketShaper's proprietary TCP rate-control technology. 
The discard policy was used to discard all packets from pre- identified, non-desirable 
traffic classes.  This policy must be applied with care to managing session-oriented TCP, since 
the resulting time-outs will delay feedback to the user.  An alternative policy, never-admit, 
enforces flow control at the entry point while informing the user immediately whenever certain 
traffic is blocked. Traffic classes that are presently being blocked on the ETSU network using 
'discard' include TCP_Port_4242, TCP_Port_6669, Audiogalaxy, CUSeeMe, Doom, eDonkey, 
Gnutella, IRC, KaZaA, Napster, Net2Phone, Quake, Unreal, Webshots, YahooGames, Battle.net, 
Blubster, Mythic, and SonyOnline.    
 The ignore policy classifies traffic that should be ignored, but nevertheless measured. 
’Ignore’ traffic is typically pass-through traffic that does not affect the bandwidth at routers and 
other access points of interest for a particular network. On the ETSU network, currently 
outbound DHCP and RIP traffic is being ignored. 
In addition to these five policies, partitions were used to allocate bandwidth among the 
competing tasks. A partition is a virtual-pipe- like mechanism that can assure a pre-defined 
bandwidth capacity for any particular traffic class. Like policies, partitions assure minimum 
required bandwidth for desirable traffic classes while restricting bandwidth for undesirable 
classes. Unlike policies, partitions are typically used for aggregate traffic classes.  
Partitions can also be fixed or burstable. While a fixed partition always allows a pre-
defined amount of bandwidth, a burstable partition allows a class to use any excess bandwidth 
available over and above the pre-defined amount of bandwidth set for that class. The ETSU 
network uses a burstable partition of 2kbps size for inbound as well as outbound ICMP traffic: 
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irrespective of the amount of network traffic, a minimum of 2kbps of bandwidth is always set 
aside specifically for ICMP. Monitoring ICMP traffic is of utmost importance as many denial of 
service (DOS) attacks extensively use ICMP services.  
Table 3.6 shows the partition summary for ICMP traffic as implemented on the ETSU 
network. 
Table 3.6: Partition Summary for ICMP Traffic 
Partition Dynamic sub partition 
Name Size-Limit Current 
Guar./Excess 
Size-Limit Current 
Active/Idle 
Max Overflow 
/Inbound Uncommitted-none 0/9.2M - - - - 
/Inbound/Average/ICMP 2000-none 0/0 - - - - 
/Inbound Max Total  2k-none 0/0 - 0/0 0 - 
/Outbound Uncommitted-none 0/9.1M - - - - 
/Outbound/Average/ICMP 2000-none 0/0 - - - - 
/Outbound Max Total  2k-none 0/0 - 0/0 0 - 
 
3.3.3.1 Feedback-Oriented Fine-Tuning  
Subsequent to the implementation of various policies and partitions, ETSU network 
bandwidth utilization was analyzed by studying various parameters such as the number of class 
hits, the number of policy hits, and the current as well as peak values for the rate of flow of 
traffic (in bps) for different traffic classes. A typical screen shot used for monitoring these 
parameters is shown in the Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Class Hits, Policy Hits and Traffic Volume for Different Classes 
 
All traffic that generated interesting parametric values was then studied in depth. The 
shaping policy effectiveness was studied. The criteria used were comparison of expected and 
actual outcome for a particular traffic class on the basis of its associated policy. For example, it 
was found that a particular faculty host machine was persistently connected to the Kazaa file-
swapping service for more than 36 hours in a particular session. The traffic measurements 
indicated that the entire traffic for this class was being discarded before it reached the host. Since 
the discard policy had been associated with Kazaa, this actual measurement was consistent the 
expected outcome and indicated that this particular policy implementation achieved its goal. 
Similarly, if the flow rate policy were assigned to a particular traffic class, the shaping 
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effectiveness would be determined by measuring whether the minimum flow rate as specified by 
the policy was indeed available for that traffic class. Other parameters examined included 
network efficiency, average and peak rate, class and partition utilization, utilization with peaks, 
transaction delays, response time, and bytes transmitted for a particular class, partition or a link. 
This data was collected over various time intervals (hourly, daily, weekly, and monthly) 
depending on the required precision of the sampling frequency and the total observation time-
period for any particular class. An observation interval range of 1 to 7 days will have a sampling 
frequency of one hour whereas the same would be one minute for an observation interval of less 
than 24 hours. Sample screenshots shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 depict the outbound as well as 
inbound traffic patterns for average and peak flow rates for a typical month during fall semester, 
2002. Hourly, daily, and weekly graphs for the corresponding period are in Appendix C. 
 
Figure 3.5: Monthly Average Rate (from 18 Sep 2002 to 18 Oct 2002) 
 
The distribution curve in Figure 3.5 indicates a dip in the average traffic rate for both 
inbound as well as outbound traffic on Sep 21, 22, 28, and 29, and on Oct 5, 6,12, and 13, 2002. 
All these dates correspond to weekends and the decreased flow rate is thus easily explained. 
 68
 
Figure 3.6: Monthly Peak Rate (from 18 Sep 2002 to 18 Oct 2002) 
The distribution curve in Figure 3.6 shows less variance throughout the entire month. 
This is an indication of the stability of the packet shaping wherein the peak flow rates are 
maintained at an almost similar level irrespective of the actual volume of traffic encountered. 
The inbound as well as outbound network utilization and efficiency curves along with the 
top ten classes for 17-18 Oct 2002 are shown below in Figures 3.7 through 3.12.  During this 
time period (24 hours), the total inbound traffic was 44917399 Kbytes whereas the total 
outbound traffic was 21853781 Kbytes. The corresponding data for hourly, weekly and monthly 
time intervals is in Appendix D. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Inbound Utilization (from 17 Oct 2002 to 18 Oct 2002) 
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The inbound link utilization as shown above indicates the lean period for the average rate 
(in bits per second) to be from midnight to 8:00 AM. This was expected. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Outbound Utilization (from 17 Oct 2002 to 18 Oct 2002) 
Unlike for inbound utilization, the outbound network utilization curve indicates that the 
severity of the dips is much less. The average rate rises around 7:00PM, when the campus 
computer labs have most students. Also, the relative dip in the average outbound rate is 
predominant from 2:00 AM to 8:00 AM—the exact time when the student computer labs are 
shut. 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Inbound Network Efficiency (from 17 Oct 2002 to 18 Oct 2002) 
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Figure 3.10: Outbound Network Efficiency (from 17 Oct 2002 to 18 Oct 2002) 
 
The network efficiency curves show the percentage of packets that are properly 
transmitted in the first attempt itself. The dips in the efficiency curve indicate retransmissions as 
well as lost packets. The efficiency level is calculated as a value = (Total bytes - Retransmitted 
bytes) / Total bytes and then expressed in percentage. These curves can thus be used as broad 
indicators of the network’s health. 
 
Figure 3.11: Inbound Top 10 Classes (from 17 Oct 2002 to 18 Oct 2002) 
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Figure 3.12: Outbound Top 10 Classes (from 17 Oct 2002 to 18 Oct 2002) 
 
For the 24-hour period under consideration, the top ten inbound and outbound classes by 
percentage volume of traffic and their average flow rate in bits per second is shown in Figures 
3.11 and 3.12. 
The application response time data for the outbound AOL-IM-ICQ traffic class based on 
24 hour time period from 24 Oct 2002 to 25 Oct 2002 can be studied using the transaction delay 
curves as well as the histograms depicting the distribution of the transaction delay for that class. 
These two graphs are shown in the figures 3.13 and 3.14. 
 
 
Figure 3.13: Transaction Delay 
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The graph in Figure 3.13 represents a timeline of the average response time (in ms) for the 
outbound AOL-IM-ICQ traffic class over a 24-hour period. Pink, blue and green lines 
indicate the total, network and server transaction delays. Any sudden or drastic increase in 
the transaction delays for traffic classes indicates possible bandwidth congestion on that link. 
The sampling frequency used in this graph is 5 minutes. 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Transaction Delay Distribution 
The transaction delay distribution histogram is based on 14 distinct categories (ranging 
from 0 to 25 seconds) of response times plotted against the frequency of transaction delays in 
each category. The median delay value (12177 ms) is indicative of the actual transaction delay 
experienced by most network hosts. This use of a median value, as opposed to an average value, 
gives a more realistic indication in the event of a few extreme values.   
 
Inputs based on traffic monitoring and other relevant data such as discovery of new 
vulnerabilities or threats were used to tweak policies for all desirable traffic classes until a 
minimum of 99% flow rate efficiency was achieved. The detailed traffic tree as on 01 April 2003 
is given in Appendix E. 
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3.3.4 Data Integrity Verification 
PacketShaper data was verified using a second, independent utility, PacketPup. 
Verification involved checking whether PacketShaper correctly identified bandwidth usage on a 
class-by-class basis.  Discrepancies between the tools’ classifications were attributable to 
PacketShaper’s support for finer degrees of traffic classification (see Appendix F for a detailed 
list of protocols and services recognized by PacketPup). For example, PacketShaper divides 
SNMP traffic, which PacketPup classifies as one stream, into distinct classes such as SNMP Mon 
(monitor) and SNMP Trap (traps). PacketShaper can also subclassify the traffic for the game 
“Quake” depending on the transport protocol used (TCP or UDP) or the game’s version. A 
sample screenshot depicting the parsing of the various rules by PacketPup is shown in figure 
3.15. Sample log file data showing the identification of various protocols in the network traffic 
using PacketPup is placed in Appendix G. 
 
3.3.5 Non-Standard Traffic  
Neither PacketShaper nor PacketPup detects non-standard, rogue traffic in standard 
traffic flow. This rogue traffic includes non-standard traffic on standard ports that cannot be 
classified further on the basis of standard traffic- identifying attributes. Identification of non-
standard traffic in standard channels of data exchange is important as there are certain ports that 
cannot be blocked even if they are known Trojan ports, since they are required for certain basic 
standard services. A step-by-step analysis of sample data is given below to illustrate the use of 
Network Probe 0.4 for identifying rogue traffic directed at standard ports. This analysis was 
carried on a ‘Friday night–early Saturday morning’ session as that is one of the most preferred 
times for students on the campus network to generate undesirable traffic. 
 74
 
Figure 3.15: PacketPup in Action 
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3.3.5.1 Step I: Initiate Network Probe 
 
This step involved configuring the network probe application and the local client to 
monitor data flow on a given network. This data was tabulated as shown below to divide the 
traffic stream on the basis of protocols. The details include the protocol’s name, the IANA 
assigned number for the protocol-port combination, the protocol’s description, the number of 
packets transmitted, the number of bytes in the traffic and each flow’s start and end time. An 
example for interpreting the protocol port column is depicted by selecting the corresponding 
value from the first row.  Here, the number 1.2048.6.443 denotes the following: 
      1 == Ethernet 
2048 == (0x0800) or IP 
      6 == TCP 
  443 == the port number for the HTTPS protocol (HTTP over TLS/SSL) 
 
Table 3.7 below shows the entire traffic at the monitoring point. 
 
Table 3.7: Network Traffic Flow Data 
 
Protocol Name Protocol Port Description Packets Bytes First Seen Last Seen 
ether.IP.TCP.https 1.2048.6.443 http protocol over TLS/SSL 2868 366946 Fri 23:34:23 Fri 23:42:34 
ether.Novell IPX 1.33079 Novell IPX 813 361167 Fri 23:34:23 Fri 23:42:29 
ether.Novell NetWare 
(LLC/SAP E0E0) 1.57568
Novell NetWare (LLC/SAP 
E0E0) 406 179933 Fri 23:34:23 Fri 23:42:29 
ether.unknown (34927) 1.34927 Unknown (34927) 490 739900 Fri 23:34:23 Fri 23:42:33 
ether.ARP 1.2054 ARP 541 32442 Fri 23:34:23 Fri 23:42:31 
ether.IP.TCP.pop3s 1.2048.6.995 
pop3 protocol over TLS/SSL 
(was spop3) 224 15334 Fri 23:34:23 Fri 23:41:54 
ether.IP.TCP.smtp 1.2048.6.25 Simple Mail Transfer 10143 11120362 Fri 23:34:23 Fri 23:42:32 
ether.IP.UDP.kerberos 1.2048.17.88 Kerberos  143 192010 Fri 23:34:25 Fri 23:42:32 
ether.IP.TCP.ldap 1.2048.6.389 
Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol 270 173354 Fri 23:34:25 Fri 23:42:32 
ether.PCS Basic Block 
Protocol 1.16962 PCS Basic Block Protocol 245 14700 Fri 23:34:24 Fri 23:42:33 
ether.IP.TCP.msft-gc 1.2048.6.3268 Microsoft Global Catalog 465 462637 Fri 23:34:24 Fri 23:42:32 
ether.IP.UDP.ldap 1.2048.17.389 
Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol 8 1642 Fri 23:34:24 Fri 23:41:02 
ether.IP.UDP.netbios-ns 1.2048.17.137 NETBIOS Name Service 136 12680 Fri 23:34:24 Fri 23:42:33 
ether.IP.ICMP 1.2048.1 
Internet Control Message           
[RFC792] 170 8793 Fri 23:34:24 Fri 23:42:24 
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ether.IP.TCP.pop3 1.2048.6.110 Post Office Protocol - Version 3 94 41796 Fri 23:34:24 Fri 23:41:49 
ether.unknown (34925) 1.34925 Unknown (34925) 922 55320 Fri 23:34:24 Fri 23:42:34 
ether.IP.TCP.domain 1.2048.6.53 Domain Name Server 260 19303 Fri 23:34:31 Fri 23:42:32 
ether.IP.UDP.bootps 1.2048.17.67 Bootstrap Protocol Server 54 20244 Fri 23:34:30 Fri 23:42:31 
ether.IP.ESP 1.2048.50 
Encapsulating Security 
Payload    [RFC1827] 3181 4429190 Fri 23:34:29 Fri 23:42:33 
ether.IP.UDP.anarchy-
online 1.2048.17.7500 Anarchy Online 31 3726 Fri 23:34:28 Fri 23:41:58 
ether.IP.OSPFIGP 1.2048.89 
OSPFIGP                      
[RFC1583,JTM4] 44 3432 Fri 23:34:27 Fri 23:42:25 
ether.IP.UDP.netbios-
dgm 1.2048.17.138 NETBIOS Datagram Service 62 15084 Fri 23:34:26 Fri 23:42:13 
ether.Novell IPX 
(propietary) 1.3308 Novell IPX (propietary) 533 197750 Fri 23:34:25 Fri 23:42:33 
ether.IP.EIGRP 1.2048.88 
EIGRP                           
[CISCO,GXS] 212 15688 Fri 23:34:25 Fri 23:42:34 
ether.DEC LAT 1.2458 DEC LAT 16 1872 Fri 23:34:45 Fri 23:42:19 
ether.IP.TCP.nntp 1.2048.6.119 
Network News Transfer 
Protocol 48 3456 Fri 23:34:41 Fri 23:41:41 
ether.IP.UDP.mdns 1.2048.17.5353 Multicast DNS 1 130 Fri 23:34:35 Fri 23:34:35 
ether.IP.TCP.www-http 1.2048.6.80 World Wide Web HTTP 247 28563 Fri 23:34:32 Fri 23:42:32 
ether.IP.TCP.imaps 1.2048.6.993 imap4 protocol over TLS/SSL 199 18690 Fri 23:34:32 Fri 23:42:32 
ether.unknown (417) 1.417 Unknown (417) 25 1500 Fri 23:34:55 Fri 23:42:15 
ether.unknown (418) 1.418 Unknown (418) 25 1500 Fri 23:34:55 Fri 23:42:15 
ether.IP.TCP.msexch-
routing 1.2048.6.691 MS Exchange Routing 2 108 Fri 23:34:54 Fri 23:39:54 
ether.IP.UDP.svrloc 1.2048.17.427 Server Location 8 728 Fri 23:35:08 Fri 23:35:40 
ether.IP.UDP.domain 1.2048.17.53 Domain Name Server 22 2806 Fri 23:35:00 Fri 23:42:30 
ether.IP. UDP.snmp 1.2048.17.161 SNMP 24 6976 Fri 23:35:22 Fri 23:42:22 
ether.unknown (8192) 1.8192 Unknown (8192) 8 2904 Fri 23:35:17 Fri 23:42:17 
ether.IP.TCP.imap 1.2048.6.143 
Internet Message Access 
Protocol 110 12800 Fri 23:35:13 Fri 23:42:13 
ether.IP.TCP.netbios-
ssn 1.2048.6.139 NETBIOS Session Service 47 43165 Fri 23:36:27 Fri 23:38:18 
ether.IP.TCP.microsoft-
ds 1.2048.6.445 Microsoft-DS 132 26562 Fri 23:36:27 Fri 23:42:20 
ether.IP.TCP.trellisagt 1.2048.6.2077 TrelliSoft Agent 21 5639 Fri 23:36:27 Fri 23:36:27 
ether.IP.TCP.epmap 1.2048.6.135 DCE endpoint resolution 16 1540 Fri 23:36:27 Fri 23:36:46 
ether.IP.TCP.unknown 1.2048.6.-1 Unknown 10 5924 Fri 23:36:46 Fri 23:40:05 
ether.DEC MOP Remote 
Console 1.24578 DEC MOP Remote Console 2 2298 Fri 23:36:55 Fri 23:38:53 
ether.IP.UDP.unknown 
(42342) 1.2048.17.42342 Unknown (42342) 1 118 Fri 23:39:00 Fri 23:39:00 
ether.IP.UDP.isakmp 1.2048.17.500 isakmp 3 482 Fri 23:41:23 Fri 23:41:26 
ether.IP.UDP.bootpc 1.2048.17.68 Bootstrap Protocol Client 4 1368 Fri 23:41:01 Fri 23:41:25 
 
 
A study of the above traffic shows incoming traffic on port 119 (as highlighted above) 
using the Network News Transfer Protocol. As listed in the websites mentioned in section 
2.1.1.2.1, port 119 is a known target port of the Trojan ‘Happy99’. According to the CERT® 
Incident Note38 IN-99-02, the ‘Happy99’ Trojan is known to have a number of aliases such as 
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SKA, Win32.ska.a, Ska.exe, Wsock32.ska, I-worm.Happy, PE_SKA, Happy, and W32/Skanew 
and affects the Microsoft Windows family of Operating Systems. The worm includes the files39 
Happy99.exe (or Happy00.exe) of size exactly 10,000 bytes, Ska.exe, Ska.dll, Wsock32.dll, and 
Liste.ska. Happy99.exe displays fireworks40 in a window titled “Happy New Year 1999” (cf. 
Figure 3.16), while infecting WSOCK32.dll and modifying the registry in the background. Once 
the system is infected, a message with the subject ‘HAPPY99’ or ‘HAPPY00’ and with a 
uuencoded attachment of the Happy99.exe file is sent to all email and Usenet addresses that 
receive mail from the infected system. The file ‘liste.ska’ keeps track of all the addresses to 
which the Trojan is sent from a particular host. Other symptoms41 of Happy99 infection include 
the possibility of the following error messages encountered while attempting to transmit 
information on the Internet: 
(i)  "Outlook caused an Invalid Page Fault in module Unknown" 
(ii) "Explorer caused an invalid page fault in module Mailnews.dll at 014f: 62060a0f" 
(iii) "MSIMN caused an invalid page fault in module unknown" 
(iv) "MSIMN caused an invalid page fault in module Inetcomm.dll" 
(v) "MSIMN caused an invalid page fault in module Kernel32.dll" 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.16: Execution of the Happy99 Trojan 
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3.3.5.2 Step II: Isolate Communication for Interesting Ports 
The next step of the investigation identified ETSU hosts involved in conversations using 
NNTP. Host usage of port 119 was tabulated for all hosts actively using this port, as shown in 
Table 3.8. This table shows NNTP usage by mail.etsu.edu and netstat.etsu.edu. Mail.etsu.edu is 
an ETSU campus mail server that primarily services faculty and staff email traffic. 
Netstat.etsu.edu, an InterMapper server, provides a graphical representation of real-time traffic 
flow and aides in monitoring the health of the campus network. 
 
Table 3.8: Hosts using NNTP 
 
Host Name Address Protocol 
Packets 
In 
Bytes 
In 
Packets 
Out 
Bytes 
Out First Seen Last Seen 
mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 ether.IP.TCP.nntp 94 8060 0 0 Fri 23:34:41 Fri 23:34:41 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 ether.IP.TCP.nntp 0 0 94 8060 Fri 23:34:41 Fri 23:48:41 
 
The information in the ‘Packets/bytes in’ and ‘Packets/bytes out’ indicates that 
netstat.etsu.edu is the source and mail.etsu.edu is the destination host. 
 
3.3.5.3 Step III: Identification of Potential Secondary Target Ports 
 
While Happy99 uses port 119, one of the versions uses port 25 if port 119 is unavailable. 
Port 25 is officially assigned to the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol for both TCP as well as UDP. 
In order to make a detailed analysis of the traffic flow and to rule out rogue data directed at 
secondary target ports, data was collected giving details of all the protocols used by the source as 
well as the destination hosts. This is tabulated in tables 3.9 and 3.10 respectively. This additional 
information (as highlighted below) was used to monitor traffic associated with SMTP. 
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Table 3.9: All Protocols used by source host (netstat.etsu.edu) 
 
Host Name Address Protocol 
Packets 
In 
Bytes 
In 
Packets 
Out 
Bytes 
Out First Seen Last Seen 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 ether.IP.UDP.snmp 0 0 72 20723 Sat 00:00:23 Sat 00:20:24 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 ether.IP.TCP.pop3s 0 0 84 6888 Sat 00:00:41 Sat 00:20:41 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 ether.IP.TCP.nntp 0 0 131 11236 Sat 00:00:41 Sat 00:20:41 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 ether.IP.UDP.bootps 0 0 21 12684 Sat 00:00:41 Sat 00:20:41 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 ether.IP.TCP.imaps 0 0 211 24923 Sat 00:00:32 Sat 00:20:32 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 ether.IP.TCP.smtp 0 0 152 13252 Sat 00:00:32 Sat 00:20:34 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 ether.IP.TCP.www-http 0 0 345 26684 Sat 00:00:04 Sat 00:20:32 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 ether.IP.UDP.svrloc 0 0 12 1260 Sat 00:05:32 Sat 00:20:53 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 ether.ARP 0 0 38 2280 Sat 00:03:17 Sat 00:19:59 
 
 
Table 3.10: All Protocols used by destination host (mail.etsu.edu) 
 
Host Name Address Protocol 
Packets 
In Bytes In 
Packets 
Out 
Bytes 
Out First Seen Last Seen 
mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 ether.IP.TCP.pop3s 407 35009 0 0 Sat 00:00:05 Sat 00:00:05 
mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 ether.IP.TCP.nntp 145 12428 0 0 Sat 00:00:41 Sat 00:00:41 
mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 ether.IP.TCP.smtp 12217 14141882 0 0 Sat 00:00:06 Sat 00:00:06 
mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 ether.IP.TCP.https 4294 610157 0 0 Sat 00:00:04 Sat 00:00:04 
mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 ether.IP.TCP.imaps 500 54406 0 0 Sat 00:00:32 Sat 00:00:32 
mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 ether.IP.TCP.www-http 465 38864 0 0 Sat 00:00:04 Sat 00:00:04 
mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 ether.ARP 5 300 0 0 Sat 00:04:23 Sat 00:04:23 
mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 ether.IP.ICMP 2 1612 0 0 Sat 00:09:25 Sat 00:09:25 
 
 
 
3.3.5.4 Step IV: Isolating Conversations from ‘Suspect’ Hosts 
This step involved isolating all possible conversations originating from the ‘suspect’ host. 
This step gives all the destination hosts for the entire traffic from the source under investigation. 
It also helps in minimizing damage to the network when the source host is transmitting malicious 
data. This data is tabulated below in table 3.11.  
 
Table 3.11: Conversations originating from netstat.etsu.edu  
 
Source Host Source Address Destination Host Dest Address Packets Bytes First Seen Last Seen 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 151.141.8.255 151.141.8.255 4 2416 Sat 00:00:41 Sat 00:03:41 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 etsufe1.etsu.edu 151.141.8.104 15 4570 Sat 00:00:23 Sat 00:04:23 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 194 17056 Sat 00:00:04 Sat 00:04:16 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 151.141.8.215 151.141.8.215 1 60 Sat 00:03:17 Sat 00:03:17 
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netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 etsusms  151.141.8.58 1 60 Sat 00:03:41 Sat 00:03:41 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 calserv.etsu.edu 151.141.8.155 1 60 Sat 00:03:55 Sat 00:03:55 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 softserv.etsu.edu 151.141.8.175 1 60 Sat 00:04:03 Sat 00:04:03 
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 ult01.etsu.edu 151.141.8.45 1 60 Sat 00:04:00 Sat 00:04:00 
 
Since Happy 99 spreads with the help of an attachment 10,000 bytes long, the check for a 
possible infection continued with a check of transmissions of more than 10,000 bytes from 
mail.etsu.edu. Using Ethereal, candidate traffic streams were reconstructed, then searched for the 
worm’s signature strings (Viz.”Happy99”, “Happy00”, “Is it a virus, a worm, a trojan?”, “ 
MOUT-MOUT Hybrid (c) Spanska 1999”,  “Happy New Year 1999 !!”,  “begin 644”, 
“Happy99.exe”, “ \Ska.exe”,  “\liste.ska”,  “\wsock32.dll”, “\Ska.dll”, and  “\Ska.exe”). A 
negative result indicated that the NNTP traffic originating from netstat.etsu.edu with the 
destination host, as mail.etsu.edu did not have the Happy99 worm. 
  
 
3.3.5.5 Step V: Target Host Investigation 
Though the traffic from netstat.etdu.edu to mail.etsu.edu seemed to be clear, the above 
data did not rule out the possibility of simultaneous exploitation of multiple vulnerabilities in a 
system resulting in the use of a spoofed IP address or a compromised host (or launching pad) for 
sending the payload after dynamically changing the target port number. This motivated the 
collection of data representing the entire traffic aimed at the destination host mail.etsu.edu. This 
data is listed below in table 3.12 
 
 
Table 3.12: Conversations for destination host (mail.etsu.edu) using NNTP and SMTP 
 
Source Host Source Address 
Destination 
Host Dest Address Packets Bytes First Seen Last Seen 
jc-c-24-159-44-87.chartertn.net 24.159.44.87 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 6 526 Sat 00:00:14 Sat 00:00:29
pcp02974522pcs.grey01.tn.comcast.net68.62.246.204 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 96 9682 Sat 00:02:21 Sat 00:07:40
loyd.etsu.edu 151.141.31.77 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 33 3147 Sat 00:02:16 Sat 00:08:17
access.etsu.edu 151.141.99.22 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 1627 1494413 Sat 00:00:06 Sat 00:08:54
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209-190-250-141.cos.com 209.190.250.141 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 14 2870 Sat 00:02:00 Sat 00:02:02
meac6st130b.etsu.edu 151.141.51.138 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 36 4992 Sat 00:01:08 Sat 00:07:08
jc-c-24-159-43-221.chartertn.net 24.159.43.221 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 39 5823 Sat 00:00:52 Sat 00:07:24
184.knoxville-04rh16rt-ca.dial-
access.att.net 12.93.223.184 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 66 9664 Sat 00:00:46 Sat 00:01:43
24.158.138.118 24.158.138.118 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 52 8594 Sat 00:01:37 Sat 00:07:40
etsuhfpwb.etsu.edu 151.141.60.237 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 39 5842 Sat 00:01:37 Sat 00:07:37
tafr82914 151.141.94.233 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 212 31112 Sat 00:01:36 Sat 00:07:53
user6.net275.nc.sprint-hsd.net 205.240.32.6 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 140 13165 Sat 00:01:32 Sat 00:07:34
etsu88025.etsu.edu 151.141.65.83 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 39 5653 Sat 00:01:32 Sat 00:07:33
etsu82355.etsu.edu 151.141.23.72 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 84 12694 Sat 00:00:44 Sat 00:08:45
66.191.248.247 66.191.248.247 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 31 5237 Sat 00:00:36 Sat 00:08:37
etsu86343.etsu.edu 151.141.8.69 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 51 8844 Sat 00:01:26 Sat 00:07:27
pcp03218068pcs.grey01.tn.comcast.net68.54.96.97 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 52 7735 Sat 00:00:29 Sat 00:08:31
holst.siteprotect.com 64.26.0.34 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 12 2412 Sat 00:00:26 Sat 00:00:28
user130.net550.nc.sprint-hsd.net 65.40.235.130 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 55 9138 Sat 00:00:05 Sat 00:08:06
etsu88565.etsu.edu 151.141.12.206 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 10 964 Sat 00:00:05 Sat 00:00:05
scabbers.ornl.gov  160.91.76.162 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 48 7119 Sat 00:00:04 Sat 00:08:05
138.knoxville-06rh16rt-ca.dial-
access.att.net 12.93.227.138 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 308 33978 Sat 00:00:04 Sat 00:08:49
out003.tpca.net 66.180.244.23 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 26 7087 Sat 00:02:47 Sat 00:06:10
netstat.etsu.edu 151.141.8.57 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 410 36423 Sat 00:00:04 Sat 00:08:41
mailserver3.iexpect.com 216.35.70.233 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 14 5384 Sat 00:02:44 Sat 00:02:52
jps-etsu 151.141.48.180 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 16 1451 Sat 00:03:27 Sat 00:03:28
members2.zippyclicks.com 64.124.168.46 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 16 13568 Sat 00:03:25 Sat 00:03:38
sccimhc01.insightbb.com 63.240.76.163 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 12 2521 Sat 00:03:46 Sat 00:03:46
etsu88505.etsu.edu 151.141.12.204 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 10 963 Sat 00:03:39 Sat 00:03:40
panther.mail.utk.edu 160.36.178.33 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 29 9091 Sat 00:04:25 Sat 00:04:38
imail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.36 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 15 3665 Sat 00:04:23 Sat 00:04:23
out009.tpca.net 66.180.244.29 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 2 168 Sat 00:05:07 Sat 00:07:07
lev+s g4.etsu.edu 151.141.85.66 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 5 422 Sat 00:05:59 Sat 00:06:00
out004.tpca.net 66.180.244.24 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 51 12580 Sat 00:06:25 Sat 00:08:26
ezproxy.etsu.edu 151.141.112.214 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 18 3851 Sat 00:06:48 Sat 00:06:48
151.141.85.169 151.141.85.169 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 4 402 Sat 00:07:22 Sat 00:07:23
e3000-1.ucg.com 198.6.95.10 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 93 123042 Sat 00:07:37 Sat 00:09:00
user229.net620.nc.sprint-hsd.net 65.41.41.229 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 15 1369 Sat 00:08:18 Sat 00:08:21
pcp03360819pcs.grey01.tn.comcast.net68.54.101.184 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 125 33749 Sat 00:08:15 Sat 00:08:38
mta101.cheetahmail.com 216.15.189.35 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 14 5636 Sat 00:07:55 Sat 00:07:57
216.98.74.17 216.98.74.17 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 13 3396 Sat 00:08:37 Sat 00:08:42
cncfw.cn.edu 12.38.254.2 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 1063 1389155 Sat 00:08:35 Sat 00:09:00
imo-d05.mx.aol.com 205.188.157.37 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 12 2240 Sat 00:08:47 Sat 00:08:48
mdlv2.h-net.msu.edu 35.8.2.252 mail.etsu.edu 151.141.8.105 49 59539 Sat 00:08:47 Sat 00:08:52
 
Again, conversations involving more than 10,000 bytes of data were identified and 
reconstructed traffic streams tested for the signature strings using Ethereal. The SMTP traffic 
stream from members2.zippyclicks.com (64.124.168.46) to mail.etsu.edu (151.141.8.105) 
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produced a positive match for the strings “MOUT-MOUT Hybrid (c) Spanska”, “Happy99.exe”, 
“ \liste.ska”, “ \wsock32.”, and “ \Ska.dll” thereby indicating the probable presence of Happy99 
Trojan in network traffic.  
The screenshots indicating the signature strings as part of the SMTP traffic reconstructed 
using Ethereal are shown in figures 3.17 and 3.18. Figure 3.19 shows the entire reconstructed 
email message which contained the above mentioned signature strings indicating the presence of 
the Happy99 Trojan. 
 
 
Figure 3.17: Positive Signature Match for the Happy99 Trojan 
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Figure 3.18: Positive Signature Match for the Happy99 Trojan—Expanded Tree 
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Figure 3.19: Reconstructed Email Message Containing the Happy99 Trojan Signature 
 
On further investigation, the URL “members2.zippyclicks.com” appeared to be 
associated with a Lyris list manager being operated for a company called “ZippyClicks”. The 
company on its website, www.zippyclicks.com, claims to be “… the leading source for 
incredible discounts, sweepstakes and coupons chosen exclusively for our user base of 
millions! …” 
  
3.3.5.6 Step VI: Physical Identification of Target Machines 
The presence of the worm was also detected by McAfee’s GroupShield Exchange 5.0 
enterprise-antivirus system. The GroupShield Exchange 5.0 antivirus tool is designed for use 
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with Microsoft Exchange 2000 Server platform. The utility is installed on ETSU’s exchange 
server ‘etsuex1.etsu.edu’ that is deployed further down the network. Had malicious code 
bypassed the antivirus system as well as the firewall and infected a network host, the target host 
would have been identified, and corrective action taken locally. The infected host’s physical 
location could be ascertained using the Action Request System software from Remedy 
Corporation. A sample screenshot from the Remedy System is shown in Figure 3.20.  
Figure 3.20: Remedy in Action 
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It is common knowledge that certain users get their personal laptops and connect them to 
the ETSU network. These ‘unauthorized’ machines would defy detection by the Remedy 
software. In such a situation, the target host identification would be based on the combination of 
the source IP address and the MAC address of the network card obtained from the network card 
conversation data for a particular session as illustrated below in table 3.13 
 
Table 3.13: Network card conversation 
 
MAC Address IP Address Packets Bytes First Seen Last Seen 
00:60:08:bf:29:b2 151.141.8.151 37 4162Sat 00:00:32 Sat 00:25:32 
00:04:4d:fc:e2:00 unknown 42 14952Sat 00:00:32 Sat 00:25:52 
00:06:5b:1a:57:6f 151.141.8.101 17 1414Sat 00:00:29 Sat 00:25:30 
00:80:a3:56:0e:91 unknown 51 5967Sat 00:00:28 Sat 00:25:40 
00:00:81:39:eb:16 151.141.55.5 784 47040Sat 00:00:27 Sat 00:26:06 
00:b0:d0:b3:ae:0b 151.141.8.197 13 1509Sat 00:00:27 Sat 00:25:59 
00:c0:4f:78:0e:11 151.141.8.214 12 1390Sat 00:06:49 Sat 00:22:09 
00:10:0d:3d:48:00 151.141.8.1 1023 484268Sat 00:00:25 Sat 00:25:36 
00:c0:4f:ae:0e:08 151.141.8.213 2 514Sat 00:06:17 Sat 00:18:20 
00:06:5b:3f:7e:90 151.141.8.106 33 3064Sat 00:00:25 Sat 00:25:26 
00:50:e4:1e:8e:2c 151.141.8.57 16 1680Sat 00:05:32 Sat 00:21:16 
00:b0:d0:f3:82:fb 151.141.8.103 38 3778Sat 00:00:24 Sat 00:25:49 
00:c0:4f:78:2e:8a 151.141.8.216 6 754Sat 00:05:20 Sat 00:25:20 
00:10:18:02:34:cb 151.141.8.50 70 4870Sat 00:00:23 Sat 00:25:41 
00:b0:d0:68:38:70 151.141.8.177 4 634Sat 00:05:18 Sat 00:17:16 
00:06:5b:39:4f:4f 151.141.8.36 14 3605Sat 00:04:23 Sat 00:04:23 
00:50:04:a9:fe:bc 151.141.8.40 17 2028Sat 00:04:10 Sat 00:17:58 
00:c0:4f:78:0c:3f 151.141.8.212 6 892Sat 00:04:08 Sat 00:16:08 
00:90:27:84:b1:1b 151.141.8.25 3 574Sat 00:04:08 Sat 00:16:06 
00:06:5b:3b:c9:e2 151.141.8.39 7 952Sat 00:03:59 Sat 00:16:16 
00:90:27:dc:f0:7d 151.141.8.53 172 20620Sat 00:00:05 Sat 00:25:38 
00:b0:d0:f3:82:fb 151.141.8.103 4394 1256652Sat 00:00:05 Sat 00:26:07 
00:06:5b:1a:57:6f 151.141.8.101 1075 736715Sat 00:00:05 Sat 00:26:07 
00:06:28:a6:57:47 unknown 780 46800Sat 00:00:04 Sat 00:26:06 
02:01:97:8d:08:69 151.141.8.104 1671 2371893Sat 00:00:04 Sat 00:26:06 
00:10:0d:3d:48:00 151.141.8.1 17750 15103522Sat 00:00:04 Sat 00:26:07 
00:50:e4:1e:8e:2c 151.141.8.57 1254 129861Sat 00:00:04 Sat 00:26:04 
00:b0:d0:d0:72:ac 151.141.8.51 1476 89506Sat 00:00:03 Sat 00:26:06 
00:02:b3:35:a7:f6 unknown 1466 87960Sat 00:00:03 Sat 00:26:06 
00:a0:c9:3d:83:20 unknown 305 52168Sat 00:00:03 Sat 00:25:59 
00:06:5b:8d:1f:44 151.141.8.110 65 10791Sat 00:00:23 Sat 00:16:28 
00:08:74:19:22:48 151.141.8.219 26 2979Sat 00:00:23 Sat 00:24:23 
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00:06:5b:0f:44:65 151.141.8.44 10 1270Sat 00:00:21 Sat 00:15:27 
00:06:28:a6:57:47 unknown 26 9438Sat 00:00:18 Sat 00:25:18 
00:90:27:de:59:c1 151.141.8.154 12 1114Sat 00:00:16 Sat 00:25:24 
00:c0:4f:0e:e2:35 151.141.8.150 390 30225Sat 00:00:15 Sat 00:25:17 
00:a0:c9:cf:dc:ca 151.141.8.153 3 574Sat 00:03:58 Sat 00:15:57 
00:a0:c9:39:aa:3a 151.141.8.15 81 9881Sat 00:00:15 Sat 00:25:44 
00:90:27:dc:ef:80 151.141.8.176 34 9410Sat 00:03:37 Sat 00:25:19 
00:c0:4f:0e:e2:35 151.141.8.150 249 15937Sat 00:00:14 Sat 00:25:18 
00:06:5b:39:4f:4f 151.141.8.36 12 1390Sat 00:03:20 Sat 00:23:23 
00:06:5b:3d:8c:0d 151.141.8.58 9 1210Sat 00:00:13 Sat 00:18:01 
00:90:27:dc:f1:31 151.141.8.155 7 814Sat 00:03:13 Sat 00:23:56 
00:b0:d0:f0:dc:a7 151.141.8.100 187 19034Sat 00:00:13 Sat 00:25:49 
00:06:5b:3c:d6:47 151.141.8.46 16 1630Sat 00:03:13 Sat 00:25:13 
00:06:5b:8c:c1:bb 151.141.8.185 6 892Sat 00:03:09 Sat 00:15:10 
00:90:27:85:8f:30 151.141.8.22 10 1270Sat 00:03:07 Sat 00:25:22 
00:90:27:85:8f:dd 151.141.8.62 9 1210Sat 00:02:58 Sat 00:20:13 
00:60:08:bf:6d:b7 151.141.8.162 12 1134Sat 00:02:48 Sat 00:24:00 
00:60:08:03:59:3b 151.141.8.183 7 1248Sat 00:02:48 Sat 00:22:02 
00:40:95:75:1c:5d unknown 143 13156Sat 00:00:11 Sat 00:26:06 
00:60:08:bf:29:b2 151.141.8.151 118 7880Sat 00:00:11 Sat 00:25:59 
00:c0:4f:01:00:c1 151.141.8.29 95 6094Sat 00:00:10 Sat 00:25:56 
00:06:5b:8d:1f:44 151.141.8.110 82 5866Sat 00:00:07 Sat 00:25:49 
00:80:a3:56:0e:cc 151.141.8.28 208 24674Sat 00:00:07 Sat 00:25:19 
00:b0:d0:f0:dc:a7 151.141.8.100 2986 2086258Sat 00:00:06 Sat 00:26:07 
00:c0:4f:ae:0e:13 151.141.8.206 5 694Sat 00:02:35 Sat 00:22:26 
00:06:5b:3f:7e:90 151.141.8.106 2883 1662425Sat 00:00:06 Sat 00:26:06 
00:10:0d:3d:48:00 151.141.8.1 338 29744Sat 00:00:06 Sat 00:26:06 
00:06:5b:1f:2d:f8 151.141.8.41 12 1390Sat 00:02:34 Sat 00:19:24 
00:e0:1e:42:8d:59 unknown 339 29832Sat 00:00:05 Sat 00:26:03 
00:b0:d0:cd:4c:e6 151.141.8.69 16 1630Sat 00:02:21 Sat 00:24:55 
00:40:95:75:1c:5d unknown 3533 1627432Sat 00:00:05 Sat 00:25:51 
00:90:27:dc:f0:09 151.141.8.54 6 892Sat 00:02:17 Sat 00:14:19 
00:60:97:ac:28:96 151.141.8.175 3 574Sat 00:02:17 Sat 00:14:17 
00:a0:c9:2d:fe:19 151.141.8.24 5 694Sat 00:02:15 Sat 00:14:53 
00:c0:4f:96:6d:69 151.141.8.225 5 694Sat 00:02:11 Sat 00:20:35 
00:c0:4f:96:6b:96 151.141.8.202 6 892Sat 00:02:07 Sat 00:14:08 
00:c0:4f:66:2f:b6 unknown 3 771Sat 00:02:06 Sat 00:26:04 
00:b0:d0:68:6b:e4 151.141.8.178 5 694Sat 00:01:57 Sat 00:20:32 
 
 88
CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
 
4.1 Results  
The inferences presented in this section are based on data collected from August 2002 to 
April 2003 using the tools described in section 3.2.2. Apart from these tools, data was also taken 
from the Cisco PIX 525 firewall log files which consisted of more than half a million entries 
(approximately 556,970 entries) for the time period under consideration.  
Section 4.2 deals with the traffic tree subclasses while section 4.3 identifies the overall 
top ten protocols in terms of percentage of ETSU’s total network traffic (inbound as well as 
outbound) based on the total number of bytes transmitted. Section 4.4 presents the percentage 
breakdown of the largest bandwidth–soaking protocol on the campus. Section 4.5 shows a 
detailed monthly breakdown of actual bandwidth utilization on the network while section 4.6 
provides a breakdown of rogue traffic on legitimate ports. Finally, section 4.7 gives the 
percentage bandwidth abuse. 
 
4.2 Bandwidth Traffic Tree 
ETSU’s campus bandwidth is currently managed by dividing inbound and outbound  
traffic into a hierarchical tree structure with various subclasses having different priority settings. 
The root class contains five subclasses, viz., ‘Discovered Ports’, ‘High’, ‘Average’, ‘Low’ and 
‘Discard’. Such a classification facilitates higher priority for mission critical applications and 
lower priority for uncritical ones. The traffic related to undesired applications and ports—and not 
already blocked by the firewall—is discarded by the PacketShaper. Pie charts that show the top 
10 members of each class categorized by average flow rate are in Appendix H. 
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4.3 Top Ten Protocols  
The top ten protocols in terms of percentage of ETSU’s total network traffic (inbound as 
well as outbound) are tabulated below in tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. 
 
Table 4.1: Inbound traffic—Top 10 Protocols  
  
 
Protocol / Application Traffic Percentage 
HTTP 76% 
WinMedia 4% 
FTP 3% 
SMTP 3% 
Real 2% 
SSL 2% 
UDP_Port_6970 2% 
NNTP 2% 
Default 1% 
MPEG-Video 1% 
All other classes  4% 
 
 
Table 4.2: Outbound traffic—Top 10 Protocols  
 
 
 
Protocol / Application Traffic Percentage 
HTTP 70% 
pcANYWHERE 7% 
SSL 5% 
FTP  5% 
SMTP 5% 
Default  3% 
Microsoft-ds 2% 
DNS   1% 
WinMedia   1% 
POP3   1% 
All other classes    2% 
 
 
 
HTTP, the predominant protocol, consumes roughly 3/4 of the  total bandwidth. This data 
is consistent with Thompson et. al.’s finding that HTTP constituted 65-75% of backbone traffic 
flow. 
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4.4 Breakdown of HTTP Traffic 
A classification of HTTP traffic by website topic, presented in Table 4.3 and depicted in 
Figure 4.1, shows a spectrum of user interest consistent with the diverse mission of ETSU.  
Table 4.3: Breakdown of HTTP Traffic  
 
Area of Interest %  Area of Interest % 
     
Email (web based) 20  Discount / Bargain websites 4 
Entertainment 11  Women's support groups 4 
News 11  Health related 3 
ETSU URLs  10  Education / Tutorials related 2 
Miscellaneous 7  Hobby sites  2 
Science and Technology related 7  Foreign language sites  1 
E-commerce (eg. eBAY) 6  History 1 
Business related 5  Job hunting 1 
Sports 5    
 
Figure 4.1: Breakdown of HTTP traffic: Percentage distribution 
5 4 6
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11103
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4.5 Bandwidth Utilization 
The inbound and outbound breakdown of actual bandwidth utilization on the ETSU 
network is given in tables 4.4 and 4.5 respectively. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 depict the bandwidth 
distribution using bar charts. 
Table 4.4: Inbound Bandwidth Utilization 
 
Time 
Period 
Mission 
Critical 
Traffic 
(Kbytes) 
Desirable 
Traffic 
(Kbytes) 
Traffic on well known 
ports associated with non-
critical applications 
(Kbytes) 
Rogue Traffic 
that evaded the 
Firewall 
(Kbytes) 
Aug 2894643 440153723 3073573 194 
Sep 3105739 715618093 2874194 897 
Oct 2489764 645623146 2467839 521 
Nov 2738495 621723864 1200734 478 
2002 
Dec 2832599 501153611 2506453 167 
Jan 1962745 564207521 1894562 456 
Feb 1096018 477981245 9894594 58 
Mar 2147250 675905489 181467 114 
2003 
Apr 3003671 762369432 3742091 608 
Total 22270924 5404736124 27835507 3493 
 
Mission 
Critical , 
22270924
Desirable , 
5404736124
Non critical 
port-based, 
27835507 Rogue , 3493
 
Figure 4.2: Inbound Bandwidth Distribution 
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The measurements indicate an almost uniform level of rogue data during the various 
months. A steep dip in the amount of rogue traffic in February seems to be an aberration to the 
trend without any seemingly justifiable reason. 
 
Table 4.5: Outbound Bandwidth Utilization 
Time 
Period 
Mission 
Critical 
Traffic 
(Kbytes) 
Desirable 
Traffic 
(Kbytes) 
Traffic on well-known 
ports associated with non-
critical applications 
(Kbytes) 
Rogue Traffic 
that evaded the 
Firewall 
(Kbytes) 
Aug 3284729 278794532 119348 237 
Sep 2503484 297154612 184737 693 
Oct 2798493 293261284 138918 168 
Nov 3105375 265245862 278492 127 
2002 
Dec 3093118 225556456 190774 91 
Jan 1483929 240184328 93483 458 
Feb 1259630 182290399 620385 651 
Mar 2313949 264214473 32310 150 
2003 
Apr 2979740 341132406 648645 151 
Total 22822447 2387834352 2307092 2726 
 
 
Mission 
Critical , 
22822447
Desirable , 
2387834352
Non critical 
port-based, 
2307092 Rogue , 2726
 
Figure 4.3: Outbound Bandwidth Distribution 
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The outbound traffic measurements also indicate an almost uniform level of rogue traffic 
with a steep dip in December. Since the total traffic levels are comparable to other months and 
the decline is only in the rogue traffic, it might suggest that the students may be the biggest 
source of outgoing rogue traffic (as most of the students were not using the campus network 
during the winter vacation).  
 
4.6 Rogue Traffic on Legitimate Ports 
Data from McAfee’s GroupShield Exchange 5.0 Enterprise Suite system indicates that 
approximately 2.5% of the traffic on the network constituted rogue traffic using legitimate 
channels of communication. A summary of the malicious data passing through legitimate ports 
classified on the basis of type and number of occurrences is tabulated below. The graphical 
distribution of this data is represented in figure 4.4. A detailed list showing the individual 
constituents of the various classes is placed in Appendix I. 
 
Table 4.6: Malicious Data in Legitimate Traffic 
 
Type of Malicious Data Number of occurrences 
Klez 25591 
Known Exploits 22569 
Sobig 4707 
Yaha 2133 
Trojans / Malicious Scripts 861 
Win 32 Worms 478 
Word Macro Viruses 325 
Nimda 116 
SirCam 113 
Known Viruses 84 
Rogue VB Script   44 
 
 94
22569:  41%
25591:  45%
44:  0%
4707:  9%
478:  1%
84:  0%
116:  0%
325:  1%
478:  1%
113:  0%
861:  2%
Rogue VB Script  
Sobig
Win 32 Worms
Klez
Known Virus
Trojans / Malicious Scripts
SirCam
Win 32 Worms
Word Macro Viruses
Nimda
Known Exploits
 
Figure 4.4: Rogue Traffic on Legitimate Ports 
 
 
4.7 Bandwidth Abuse  
This section deals with the bandwidth abuse calculations on the ETSU network. Tables 
4.7 and 4.8 quantify the inbound and outbound total traffic as well as rogue traffic (in number of 
actual kilobytes transmitted) that evaded the firewall and was detected and finally discarded 
using the PacketShaper. Figure 4.5 uses a pie chart to highlight the difference between the total 
traffic and rogue traffic on the network. 
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Table 4.7: Inbound Total Traffic vs. Rogue Traffic 
 
Time Period Total Traffic (Kbytes) Rogue Traffic that evaded the firewall (Kbytes) 
Aug 500167483 194 
Sep 778214003 897 
Oct 694653132 521 
Nov 625795271 478 
2002 
Dec 506493793 167 
Jan 608367221 456 
Feb 781976592 58 
Mar 678255235 114 
2003 
Apr 769120652 608 
Total 5943043382 3493 
 
Table 4.8: Outbound Total Traffic vs. Rogue Traffic 
 
Time Period Total Traffic (Kbytes) Rogue Traffic that evaded the firewall (Kbytes) 
Aug 283794532 237 
Sep 301148615 693 
Oct 297581263 168 
Nov 271253367 127 
2002 
Dec 228841638 91 
Jan 243184735 458 
Feb 293298565 651 
Mar 266568533 150 
2003 
Apr 344763543 151 
Total 2530434791 2726 
 
 
Total Traffic, 
8473478173
Rogue Traffic, 
6219
Total Traffic Rogue Traffic
 
Figure 4.5: Bandwidth Abuse 
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Total (Inbound and Outbound) traffic:   8473478173 Kilo Bytes 
Total (Inbound and Outbound) rogue traffic:  6219 Kilo Bytes 
% Bandwidth Abuse: 0.000073393% or 7.3393e-5 
 
 
4.7.1 Bandwidth Abuse Analysis 
While bandwidth measurements as shown above indicate negligible bandwidth abuse on 
the campus network, the figures may be misleading for the following reasons: 
1. These measurements are done using the PacketShaper. Since the PacketShaper is 
placed inside the firewall, these measurements reflect only the traffic permitted by the firewall. A 
substantial part of the undesirable traffic has been discarded before it reaches the PacketShaper. 
2. HTTP traffic forms as much as 70-76% of the entire traffic. Even though the 
firewall logs facilitate traffic classification (as shown in figure 4.11 and table 4.19), it is difficult 
to classify traffic as “desirable” (official) or “undesirable” (personal) on any university network. 
While most commercial organizations have a clearly defined “area of professional interest”, 
universities like ETSU offer courses in almost all the categories as classified in table 4.19 and 
hence traffic in all these classes may be justified as “desirable”. This thesis regards the entire 
HTTP traffic as desirable traffic for the purpose of bandwidth measurement.  
 97
CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1  Defense–In–Depth  
Effective bandwidth management and secure network transactions can be achieved by 
using appropriate policies and tools. A secure network with assured bandwidth availability for 
mission critical applications is crucial for information assurance. However, the absence of a 
“silver bullet” mechanism to achieve meaningful security necessitates the adoption of the 
defense–in–depth strategy. This approach relies on multiple layers of security thereby 
eliminating a single point of failure. This helps in minimizing the overall damage to the network 
even if one of the layers of defense is compromised. An effective defense–in–depth strategy 
would include components such as firewalls, network as well as host intrusion detection and 
intrusion prevention systems, packet shapers, network management systems, protocol analyzers, 
vulnerability scanners, anti–virus and anti-Trojan programs, and cryptographic tools to encrypt 
sensitive data. Establishment of a DMZ and ensuring that unwanted ports remain closed at all 
times are also effective practices. Seamless integration of the various layers of security is crucial 
for achieving the key attributes of information assurance, viz., confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, and non-repudiation. 
 
5.2 The ‘KHYATI’ Paradigm 
To be totally effective, the defense–in–depth approach should be complemented by the 
KHYATI (Knowledge, Host hardening, Yauld monitoring, Analysis, Tools and Implementation) 
paradigm. The underlying concepts behind the different constituents of the KHYATI paradigm 
are outlined in sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.6. 
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5.2.1 Knowledge 
Knowledge as a key for ensuring network security cannot be overemphasized. 
Knowledge of the various threats as well as the methods to deal with them remains one of the 
most important elements in any security policy. The success of security policies depends to a 
great extent on the level of knowledge and awareness of the people of any particular 
organization. Knowledge is a double-edged sword. While the black hats rely on intricate system 
knowledge to exploit vulnerabilities, the same knowledge can be used by system administrators 
to secure their networks form dedicated attacks. Knowledge about the workings of potentially 
dangerous tools like root-kits can protect against malicious attacks. A case in point is a 
comprehensive list prepared by “SnakeByte51” at http://www.snake-basket.de/e/AV.txt, which 
lists the files used by various anti-virus programs.  While Trojans and other malicious code can 
use this information to disable the anti-virus programs, system administrators can use the same 
information to verify the integrity and efficacy of their anti-virus systems. An attempt was made 
throughout the study period to keep current with new vulnerabilities and exploits. 
 
5.2.2 Host hardening 
“A chain is only as strong as its weakest link”. No amount of network hardening and 
perimeter security measures undertaken by a system administrator can assure meaningful 
security as long as the individual hosts are not secure enough. An able attacker may use access to 
a single host to compromise the entire network. Host hardening involves using secure passwords, 
access policies and security-oriented practices aimed at improving the individual host’s effective 
security. The prerequisite for this is requisite knowledge regarding the various threats and 
vulnerabilities and how to deal with them. If each host on the network is fully secure, the need 
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for aggressive centralized security—and the damage from its breach—may be reduced 
considerably. 
 
  
5.2.3 Yauld monitoring 
Nothing can replace the benefits achieved by yauld or aggressive monitoring. As shown 
in the preceding sections, active network monitoring helps in reducing bandwidth abuse 
effectively. Constant and aggressive monitoring facilitates preventive action not only against 
well-known vulnerabilities but also against ‘zero-day exploits’.  
 
5.2.4 Analysis  
Aggressive monitoring in itself may not produce the required results unless it is 
complemented by a thorough and detailed analysis of the data. Computer forensics have shown 
the potential to prevent system damage when data generated by monitoring tools is analyzed 
correctly and in a timely way. Many hacking attempts are preceded by tell- tale signs like 
systematic and sustained port scanning. A timely and correct threat assessment based on analysis 
of firewall logs might go a long way in thwarting such attacks. Robert Graham50 has compiled a 
list of common port scans and their implications at http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/firewall-
seen.html#1. This may be helpful in a meaningful analysis of various probes on a network and 
maybe be used to abort potential attacks. 
 
 
5.2.5 Tools 
The appropriate tools and applications necessary to thwart attacks must be available. In 
addition to preventive tools like vulnerability scanners and IDSs, the system administrator must 
be equipped with tools that minimize the damage in the aftermath of an attack. No amount of 
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knowledge, monitoring and data-analysis can offset the lack of appropriate tools. The choice of 
tools depends on the organization’s role as well as the criticality of the network data and 
resources that needs to be protected. 
 
5.2.6 Implementation 
Last but not the least, the actual implementation of the various security policies is of 
utmost importance. As the old adage goes, “its not what technology can do, but what’s important 
is what you can do with technology”. Despite the awareness and availability of the correct tools, 
the inability to properly implement the policies has resulted in a number of avoidable casualties. 
An effective implementation policy would be based on constant feedback, compliance checks, 
and regular vulnerability assessments. 
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APPENDIX A 
  
 
PROTOCOLS AND SERVICES SUPPORTED BY ETHEREAL 
 
A AAL1, AAL3_4, AARP, AFP, AFS (RX), AH, AIM, AJP13, AODV, AODV6, 
ARCNET, ARP/RARP, ASAP, ASP, ATM, ATM LANE, ATP, AVS WLANCAP, 
Auto-RP 
B BACapp, BACnet, BEEP, BGP, BOFL, BOOTP/DHCP, BOOTPARAMS, BOSSVR, 
BROWSER, BVLC, Boardwalk 
C CDP, CDS_CLERK, CFLOW, CGMP, CHDLC, CLEARCASE, CLNP, CLTP, CONV, 
COPS, COTP, CPHA, CUPS, CoSine 
D DCCP, DCERPC, DCE_DFS, DDP, DDTP, DEC_STP, DFS, DHCPv6, DLSw, DNS, 
DNSSERVER, DSI, DTSPROVIDER, DTSSTIME_REQ, DVMRP, Data, Diameter 
E EAP, EAPOL, EIGRP, ENC, EPM, ESIS, ESP, ETHERIP, Ethernet, 
F FC, FC ELS, FC FZS, FC-FCS, FC-SWILS, FC-dNS, FCIP, FCP, FC_CT, FDDI, FIX, 
FLDB, FR, FTP, FTP-DATA, FTSERVER, FW-1, Frame 
G GIOP, GMRP, GNUTELLA, GRE, GSS-API, GTP, GTPv0, GTPv1, GVRP 
H H.261, H1, HCLNFSD, HPEXT, HSRP, HTTP, HyperSCSI 
I IAPP, IB, ICAP, ICMP, ICMPv6, ICP, ICQ, IEEE 802.11, IGMP, IGRP, ILMI, IMAP, 
IP, IPComp, IPFC, IPP, IPX, IPX MSG, IPX RIP, IPX SAP, IPv6, IRC, ISAKMP, 
ISDN, ISIS, ISL, ISUP, IUA 
K KLM, KRB5, KRB5RPC 
L L2TP, LACP, LANMAN, LAPB, LAPBETHER, LAPD, LDAP, LDP, LLAP, LLC, 
LMI, LMP, LPD, LSA, LSA_DS, Lucent/Ascend 
M M2PA, M2TP, M2UA, M3UA, MAPI, MGMT, MIPv6, MMSE, MOUNT, MPEG1, 
MPLS, MRDISC, MS Proxy, MSDP, MSNIP, MSNMS, MTP2, MTP3, MTP3MG, 
Mobile IP, Modbus/TCP, MySQL 
N NBDS, NBIPX, NBNS, NBP, NBSS, NCP, NDMP, NDPS, NETLOGON, NFS, 
NFSACL, NFSAUTH, NIS+, NIS+ CB, NLM, NMPI, NNTP, NSPI, NTLMSSP, NTP, 
NetBIOS, Null 
O OAM AAL, OSPF, OXID 
P PCNFSD, PFLOG, PGM, PIM, POP, PPP, PPP BACP, PPP BAP, PPP CBCP, PPP CCP, 
PPP CDPCP, PPP CHAP, PPP Comp, PPP IPCP, PPP IPV6CP, PPP LCP, PPP MP, PPP 
MPLSCP, PPP PAP, PPP PPPMux, PPP PPPMuxCP, PPP VJ, PPPoED, PPPoES, PPTP, 
Portmap, Prism 
Q Q.2931, Q.931, QLLC, QUAKE, QUAKE2, QUAKE3, QUAKEWORLD 
R RADIUS, RANAP, REMACT, REP_PROC, RIP, RIPng, RMI, RMP, RPC, 
RPC_BROWSER, RPC_NETLOGON, RPL, RQUOTA, RSH, RSTAT, RSVP, RSYNC, 
RS_ACCT, RS_ATTR, RS_PGO, RS_REPADM, RS_REPLIST, RS_UNIX, RTCP, 
RTMP, RTP, RTSP, RWALL, RX, Raw, Rlogin 
S SADMIND, SAMR, SAP, SCCP, SCCPMG, SCSI, SCTP, SDLC, SDP, SECIDMAP, 
SGI MOUNT, SIP, SKINNY, SLARP, SLL, SMB, SMB Mailslot, SMB Pipe, SMPP, 
SMTP, SMUX, SNA, SNA XID, SNAETH, SNMP, SPNEGO-KRB5, SPOOLSS, 
SPRAY, SPX, SRVLOC, SRVSVC, SSCOP, SSH, SSL, STAT, STAT-CB, STP, SUA, 
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Serialization, SliMP3, Socks, Spnego, Syslog 
T TACACS, TACACS+, TAPI, TCP, TDS, TELNET, TFTP, TIME, TKN4Int, TNS, 
TPKT, TR MAC, TSP, TZSP, Token-Ring 
U UBIKDISK, UBIKVOTE, UCP, UDP 
V V.120, VLAN, VRRP, VTP, Vines, Vines FRP, Vines SPP 
W WBXML, WCCP, WCP, WHDLC, WHO, WINREG, WKSSVC, WSP, WTLS, WTP 
X X.25, X.29, X11, XDMCP, XOT, XYPLEX 
Y YHOO, YMSG, YPBIND, YPPASSWD, YPSERV, YPXFR 
Z ZEBRA, ZIP 
Misc. 802.11 MGT, cds_solicit, cprpc_server, dce_update, iSCSI, mdshdr, roverride, rpriv, 
rs_misc, rsec_login 
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APPENDIX B 
 PROTOCOLS AND SERVICES CLASSIFIED BY PACKETSHAPER 
 
 
Service Description 
ActiveX  Microsoft’s object-oriented program technologies and tools  
AFP  AppleTalk Filing Protocol (AppleShare IP)  
AppleTalk  Apple’s network protocol  
AURP  AppleTalk Update-based Routing Protocol  
Baan  Baan enterprise management system  
BackWeb 
(Polite)  
Push technology. Polite BackWeb has an agent on the client to prevent BackWeb 
background traffic from interfering with other IP network applications. 
BGP  Border Gateway Protocol 
Biff  UNIX new mail notification 
CBT  Core-based Trees (Multicast Routing Protocol) 
ccMail  cc:Mail email application  
CiscoDiscovery  Cisco Router Discovery Protocol 
Citrix  Connectivity application to access applications across any type of network connection.  
Citrix-ICA  Citrix ICA  
Citrix-SB  Citrix server browsing (UDP)  
Clarent-CC  Clarent Voice over IP Command Center  
Clarent-
Complex  
Clarent complex traffic  
Clarent-Mgmt  Clarent management traffic  
Clarent-Voice-S  Clarent voice traffic (simple)  
Client  The client end of any connection (not auto-discovered)  
CORBA  CORBA Internet Inter-ORB Protocol (IIOP)  
CRS  Microsoft Content Replication Service and Distributed Password Authentication  
CU-Dev  Fujitsu Device Control (CU-DEV on TCP/IP) 
CUSeeMe  Internet telephone application service group 
CUSeeMe-av  Internet telephone audio/video 
CUSeeMe-ce  Internet telephone connection establishment 
CUSeeMe-cl  Internet telephone connection listener 
DCOM  Microsoft Distributed Component Object Model 
DECnet  Digital Equipment Corporation’s network protocol 
DHCP  Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
DHCP-C  DHCP or BootP Client 
DHCP-S  DHCP or BootP Server 
DLS  SNA and FNA over TCP transport—Service group classification of Data Link Switch 
traffic, both read and write port numbers 
DLS-RPN  Data Link Switch Read Port Number 
DLS-WPN  Data Link Switch Write Port Number 
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DNS  Domain Name Service 
Doom  Doom, the game  
DPA  Microsoft’s Distributed Password Authentication 
DRP  DECnet Routing Protocol  
EGP  Network Routing Information (Exterior Gateway Protocol)  
EIGRP  Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol  
FileMaker Pro  Database Application  
Finger  Finger User Information Protocol  
FIX  Financial Information eXchange  
FNA  Fujitsu Network Architecture (a variant of SNA)  
FNAonTCP-1  Transport Independent Convergence - FNA on TCP port 492  
FNAonTCP-2  Transport Independent Convergence - FNA on TCP port 493  
FTP  File Transfer Protocol service group classification—both FTP 
commands and data 
FTP-Cmd  File Transfer Protocol command channel 
FTP-Data  File Transfer Protocol data transfer channel 
Gopher  Search application 
GRE  General Routing Encapsulation  
Groupwise  Novell Groupwise messaging system  
Groupwise-MTA  Novell Groupwise Message Transfer Agent  
Groupwise-POA  Novell Groupwise Post Office Agent  
H.323  Internet telephony standard service group  
H.323-GKD  H.323 Gatekeeper Discovery  
H.323-H.245  H.323 call control  
H.323-Q.931  H.323 call setup 
H.323-RAS  H.323 Gatekeeper Control (Registration, Admission, and Status) 
HTTP (Web)  Web traffic—Hypertext Transport Protocol 
I-Phone  Phone service via the Internet  
ICMP  Internet Control Message Protocol 
Ident  Identification Protocol 
IGMP  Internet Group Management Protocol 
IMAP  Interactive Mail Access Protocol 
IP  Internet Protocol (not auto-discovered)  
IPSec  IP Security Encapsulation  
IPSec-AH  IPSec Authentication Header  
IPSec-ESP  IPSec Encapsula ting Security Payload  
IPv6  Internet Protocol version 6  
IPX  Novell’s networking protocol  
IRC  Internet Relay Chat  
IRC-194  IRC on port 194  
IRC-6665  IRC on port 6665 (server to server)  
IRC-6667  IRC on port 6667 (client to server)  
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ISAKMP  ISAKMP/IKE key exchange  
Kali  Gaming Protocol  
Kerberos  Network Authentication Service (ticket granting and checking)  
L2TP  Level 2 Tunneling Protocol for VPN connections (UDP 
encapsulation)  
LAT  DEC Printer Support (Local Area Transport)  
LDAP  Lightweight Directory Access Protocol  
Lockd  Lock Daemon  
LotusNotes  Groupware for collaborative communication  
Marimba  Marimba’s Castanet push technology  
Micom-VIP  Micom Voice over IP (V/IP)  
MPEG-Audio  Moving Picture Experts Group - Audio Streams  
MPEG-Video  Moving Picture Experts Group - Video Streams  
MSSQ  Microsoft Message Queue Traffic  
MSSQ-CQ  MSSQ Client Queue  
MSSQ-IS  MSSQ Information Store  
MSSQ-Ping  MSSQ Ping Mechanism  
MSSQ-QMT  MSSQ Queue Manager Traffic  
MSSQ-SQ  MSSQ Server Queue  
MS-SQL  Service group for both Microsoft SQL Mon and Server traffic  
MS-SQL-Mon  Microsoft SQL Monitor  
MS-SQL-Server  Microsoft Structured Query Language (SQL) Server  
NetBEUI  Service group for NetBEUI—Network protocol for PCs  
NetBIOS-IP  NetBIOS over IP  
NetBIOS-IP-NS  NetBIOS Name Service  
NetBIOS-IP-SSN  NetBIOS Session Service  
NFS  Network File System (both TCP and UDP)  
NNTP (News)  Network News Transfer Protocol  
NTP  Network Time Protocol  
NW5-CMD  Netware 5 - Compatibility Mode Drivers service group  
NW5-CMD-TCP  Netware 5 - Compatibility Mode Drivers over TCP  
NW5-CMD-UDP  Netware 5 - Compatibility Mode Drivers over UDP  
NW5-NCP  Netware 5 Core Protocol  
OpenConnect-JCP  Browser-based access to host applications  
Oracle   Database application  
OracleClient  Oracle Java client (Webforms)  
Oracle-netv1  Oracle SQL*Net v1  
Oracle -netv2  Oracle SQL*Net v2  
Oracle 8i  Oracle 8i by database name  
OSI  OSI over TCP (RFC2126), e.g., Microsoft Exchange X.400 
OSPF  Network Routing Information (Open Shortest-Path First) 
pcAnywhere  Remote management collaboration tool 
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pcAnywhere-D  pcAnywhere data 
pcAnywhere-OD  pcAnywhere data (old port)  
pcAnywhere-OS  pcAnywhere status (old port)  
pcAnywhere-S  pcAnywhere status  
PIM  Protocol-Independent Multicast Routing Protocol  
PointCast  Push technology application  
POP3 (Mail) Post office protocol for email POP3 (Mail)  
PPTP Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol  
Printer UNIX line printer spooler (LPR)  
Quake Quake, the game  
Quake-A Quake 1  
Quake-B Quake 2  
Quake-II-TCP Quake over TCP  
Quake-II-UDP Quake over UDP  
RADIUS Service group for Remote Authentication Dial- in Service  
RADIUS-Acct RADIUS accounting service  
RADIUS-Auth RADIUS authentication service  
RARP Reverse Address Resolution Protocol  
RC5DES DES (data encryption standard) encryption-cracking application  
RDP Remote Desktop Protocol—Microsoft’s Windows Terminal Server  
RealAudio Service group for RealAudio streaming audio/video application—both TCP 
and UDP 
RealAudio-TCP Streaming audio/video application TCP channel  
RealAudio-UDP Streaming audio/video application UDP channel  
REXEC UNIX remote execution protocol  
RIP Routing Information Protocol (UDP)  
RTCP-B Real-time control protocol (broadcast)  
RTCP-I Real-time control protocol (interactive)  
RTP-B Real-time protocol (broadcast)  
RTP-I Real-time protocol (interactive)  
RTSP Real-time Streaming Protocol  
rwho Reports current users for all hosts on the local network  
SHOUTcast Streaming audio  
SLP Service Location Protocol  
SMS Microsoft SMS (Systems Management Server) Help Desk  
SMS-Auth Microsoft SMS authentication  
SMS-Chat  Microsoft SMS remote chat  
SMS-File  Microsoft SMS file transfer  
SMS-RC  Microsoft SMS remote control  
SMTP (Mail)  Simple Mail Transfer Protocol  
SNA  IBM’s Systems Network Architecture protocol  
SNMP  Service group for both Simple Network Management Protocol monitor and traps 
 111
  
Source: PacketShaper Reference Guide version 4.1
SNMP Mon  Simple Network Management Protocol monitor  
SNMP Trap  Simple Network Management Protocol traps  
SOCKS  SOCKS Proxy Protocol  
Spanning Tree  IEEE802.1 Bridge Spanning Tree  
SSH  Secure shell remote login protocol  
SSL  Secure Sockets Layer protocol  
ST2  Internet Stream Protocol, version 2  
StreamWorks  StreamWorks Audio and Video  
SunRPC  Sun’s Remote Procedure Calls (UDP)  
Syslog  UNIX System Logging  
T.120  Collaboration application  
TACACS  Login host protocol  
TCP  Transmission Control Protocol—all Internet TCP traffic (not auto-
discovered)  
Telnet  Network terminal protocol  
TFTP  Trivial File Transfer Protocol  
Timbuktu  Timbuktu Pro service group; networked remote control application  
Timbuktu-ctl  Timbuktu Control Channel  
Timbuktu-hs  Timbuktu Handshaking  
Timbuktu-obs  Timbuktu Observe Channel  
Timbuktu-snd  Timbuktu Send Channel  
Timbuktu-xch  Timbuktu Exchange Channel  
TN3270  Telnet for IBM 3270 terminals and 3270 emulation  
TN3287  IBM 3270 print traffic (TN3287 extensions)  
TN5250  IBM 5250 terminal traffic over Telnet  
TN5250p  IBM 5250 print traffic over Telnet  
UDP  User Datagram Protocol—all Internet UDP traffic (not auto-discovered)  
UUCP  Unix-to-Unix Copy Protocol  
VDOPhone  Service group for Internet telephone application (not auto-discovered)  
VDOPhone-a  Internet telephone application—TCP port 1 (not auto-discovered)  
VDOPhone-b  Internet telephone application—TCP port 2 (not auto-discovered)  
VDOPhone-UDP  VDOPhone real-time media (not auto-discovered)  
Whois  Application that identifies the owner of a domain name  
WindowsMedia  Microsoft Windows Media Player  
WindowsMedia-T  Windows Media Streaming over TCP  
WindowsMedia-U  Windows Media Streaming over UDP  
WINS  Windows Internet Name Service  
XWindows  X11 Windowing agent (UDP)  
XWindows-DM  XWindows Display Manager (XDMCP)  
XWindows-S  XWindows Server  
YahooMsg  Yahoo! Messenger 
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APPENDIX C 
 
SAMPLE AVERAGE AND PEAK FLOW RATES 
 
 
Hourly Average Rate (18 Oct 2002: 09:00 to 10:00) 
 
 
 
 
Hourly Peak Rate (18 Oct 2002: 09:00 to 10:00) 
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Daily Average Rate (17 Oct to 18 Oct 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daily Peak Rate (17 Oct to 18 Oct 2002) 
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Weekly Average Rate (11 Oct to 18 Oct 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
Weekly Peak Rate (11 Oct to 18 Oct 2002) 
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APPENDIX D 
 
NETWORK PERFORMANCE SUMMARY 
 
Hourly Inbound Utilization 
 
 
 
 
 
Hourly Inbound Network Efficiency 
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Hourly Inbound Top 10 Classes 
 
 
 
 
Hourly Outbound Utilization 
 
 
 
Hourly Outbound Network Efficiency 
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Hourly Outbound Top 10 Classes 
 
 
 
Weekly Inbound Utilization 
 
 
 
Weekly Inbound Network Efficiency 
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Weekly Inbound Top 10 Classes 
 
 
 
Weekly Outbound Utilization 
 
 
 
Weekly Outbound Network Efficiency 
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Weekly Outbound Top 10 Classes 
 
 
 
Monthly Inbound Utilization 
 
 
 
Monthly Inbound Network Efficiency 
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Monthly Inbound Top 10 Classes 
 
 
 
Monthly Outbound Utilization 
 
 
 
Monthly Outbound Network Efficiency 
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Monthly Outbound Top 10 Classes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total Kbytes Received Total Kbytes Sent 
Hourly 2490145 1152978 
Daily 44917399 21853781 
Weekly 259153192 166159166 
Monthly 905631746 497226101 
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APPENDIX E 
 
ETSU NETWORK TRAFFIC TREE AS ON APRIL 01 2003 
  
Class name Type Class Policy Cur 1 Min Peak 
  hits hits rate avg rate 
       
/Inbound +  n/a 5.3M 5.0M 8.9M 
Localhost PE 131 131 0 0 4
Discard E  n/a 0 0 22
TCP_Port_4242 P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_6669 P 0 0 0 0 0
Audiogalaxy P 0 0 0 0 0
CUSeeMe P 0 0 0 0 0
Doom P 0 0 0 0 0
eDonkey P 0 0 0 0 0
Gnutella P 26 26 0 0 0
Half-Life P 0 0 0 0 0
IRC P 0 0 0 0 0
KaZaA P 2827 2827 0 0 0
Napster P 4 4 0 0 0
Net2Phone P 0 0 0 0 0
Quake P 0 0 0 0 0
SHARESUDP P 0 0 0 0 0
TFTP P 0 0 0 0 0
Unreal P 0 0 0 0 0
Webshots P 3 3 0 0 10
YahooGames P 6 6 0 0 0
Battle.net P 0 0 0 0 0
Blubster P 0 0 0 0 0
CU-DEV P 0 0 0 0 0
Echo P 0 0 0 0 0
Mythic P 0 0 0 0 0
SonyOnline P 0 0 0 0 0
High E  n/a 858011.4k 123k 
Kerberos P 38 38 0 0 9906
LDAP P 12 12 0 0 10
NTP P 3468 3468 0 14 954
OracleEM P 0 0 0 0 0
RADIUS P 0 0 0 0 0
SNMP P 5774 5774 0 57710.9k 
Day-Time P 21 21 70 36 7921
DNS P 158820 158820 843910.4k 122k 
INFOC-RTMS P 0 0 0 0 0
SLP P 0 0 0 0 0
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SMS P 126 126 442 324 6427
TimeServer P 36 36 2 2 397
WINS P 0 0 0 0 0
Low E  n/a 703k 714k 8.9M 
TCP_Port_10110 P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_10120 P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_1026 P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_2011 P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_5001 P 2 2 0 525.9k 
TCP_Port_5010 P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_6009 P 42 42 493 272 3358
TCP_Port_6016 P 220 220 0 6810.8k 
TCP_Port_7226 P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_80 P 788 785 413 12462.9k 
TCP_Port_85 P 0 1 0 0 0
UDP_Port_6970 P 141 138173k 197k 1.3M 
AFS P 0 0 0 0 0
BackWeb P 4 4 0 021.5k 
Chaincast P 0 0 0 0 0
CIFS-TCP P 0 0 0 0 0
CVSpserver P 0 0 0 0 0
Finger P 0 0 0 0 0
FTP P 5312 530628.4k 18.3k 1.4M 
Gopher P 3 3 0 0 168
lockd P 1 1 0 0 0
Marimba P 2 2 18 18 18
MPEG-Audio P 25 25 1 12.5M 
MPEG-Video P 161 161 2 22.9M 
MSN-Messenger P 191 190 149 6752.7k 
QuickTime P 7 7 0 18051.0M 
RC5DES P 9 9 0 0 362
Real P 257 25780.5k 92.5k 2.2M 
rsync P 0 0 0 0 0
Shoutcast P 0 0 0 0 0
SMTP P 31994 31983 133k 112k 1.2M 
WHOIS P 1 1 0 0 3
WinMedia P 294 292258k 257k 1.3M 
YahooMsg P 30 30 64 76 4112
AOL-IM-ICQ P 137 137 605 42126.7k 
ISAKMP P 1 1 0 0 2776
Kontiki P 16 16 0 0 292
Microsoft -ds P 119 119 6 68.8M 
NetBIOS-IP P 131 131 0 0 568
NFS P 0 0 0 0 0
RTSP P 26 24 14 20 1230
Average E  n/a 4.6M 4.4M 7.2M 
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GRE P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_8080 P 226 226 0 2 2851
ATSTCP P 0 0 0 0 0
ccMail P 0 0 0 0 0
Citrix   n/a 0 0 1
Default P 1 1 0 0 1
CitrixIMA P 0 0 0 0 0
DLS P 0 0 0 0 0
FileMaker P 1 1 0 5 3196
Groupwise P 22 2210.8k 5983123k 
HTTP P 594372 5939104.1M 4.2M 7.1M 
Ident P 7 7 0 0 213
IMAP P 224 253 0 2687.6k 
LotusNotes P 0 0 0 0 0
MATIP P 0 0 0 0 0
MCK-Signaling P 0 0 0 0 0
MSSQL P 1 1 0 0 0
NNTP P 0 0 0 0 0
NW5-CMD P 1 1 0 0 0
Oracle P 84 84 0 329.9k 
Persona P 0 0 0 0 0
POP3 P 5598 5588 1127 1067279k 
PPTP P 1 1 0 0 0
RDP P 1 1 0 0 0
RTCP-I P 0 0 0 0 0
RTP-I P 0 0 0 0 0
SMTBF P 1 1 3 3 3
SSH P 14 14 0 4609215k 
SSL P 10176 10168 363k 248k 1.1M 
T.120 P 0 0 0 0 0
Telnet P 43 43 0 45226.4k 
Timbuktu P 1 1 0 0 189
VNC P 1 1 0 22475k 
WebEx P 0 0 0 0 0
XWindows P 0 0 0 0 0
DCOM P 22 22 32 915.2k 
H.323 P 1 1 0 4 2327
pcANYWHERE P 972 972 0 831.6k 
ICMP #NAME? 15395 15395 284 17117.2k 
rsh  0n/a 0 1 636
MeetingMaker  0n/a 0 0 0
NW5-NCP  9n/a 0 0 0
StreamWorks  1n/a 0 0 0
DiscoveredPorts   n/a 156 14241.9k 
TCP_Port_12968  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_13311  0n/a 0 0 0
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TCP_Port_17037  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_17202  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_17801  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_18511  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_19397  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_2048  287n/a 100 8324.3k 
TCP_Port_21153  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_2443  107n/a 0 2213.5k 
TCP_Port_26161  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_27423  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_32110  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_34277  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_36935  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_3899  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_4000  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_40376  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_41320  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_4170  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_42783  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_444  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_45581  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_46481  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_46801  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_5100  4n/a 0 026.2k 
TCP_Port_5190  34n/a 101 7315.4k 
TCP_Port_5730  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_59560  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_63005  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_7152  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_7755  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_8016  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_8200  0n/a 36 27 90
TCP_Port_8282  2137n/a 56 7931.7k 
TCP_Port_8384  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_88  14n/a 0 011.5k 
TCP_Port_8999  10n/a 0 020.4k 
TCP_Port_9217  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_9991  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_8197  0n/a 0 0 0
Default P I 18817 21420 1974 1869286k 
       
/Outbound +  n/a 970k 1.1M 9.1M 
Localhost PE 131 131 0 0 3
SameSide PE 0 0 0 0 0
Discard E  n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_4242 P 0 0 0 0 0
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TCP_Port_6669 P 0 0 0 0 0
Audiogalaxy P 0 0 0 0 0
CUSeeMe P 0 0 0 0 0
Doom P 0 0 0 0 0
eDonkey P 0 0 0 0 0
Gnutella P 30 30 0 0 0
Half-Life P 0 0 0 0 0
IRC P 0 0 0 0 0
KaZaA P 4151 4151 0 0 0
MATIP P 0 0 0 0 0
Napster P 4 4 0 0 0
Net2Phone P 0 0 0 0 0
Quake P 0 0 0 0 0
Unreal P 0 0 0 0 0
Webshots P 1 1 0 0 0
YahooGames P 6 6 0 0 0
Battle.net P 0 0 0 0 0
Blubster P 0 0 0 0 0
Mythic P 0 0 0 0 0
SonyOnline P 0 0 0 0 0
Average E  n/a 888k 956k 6.3M 
GRE P 0 0 0 0 0
ATSTCP P 0 0 0 0 0
ccMail P 0 0 0 0 0
Citrix   n/a 0 0 0
Default P 1 1 0 0 0
CitrixIMA P 0 0 0 0 0
DLS P 0 0 0 0 0
FileMaker P 1 1 0 9 1222
Groupwise P 22 22 1694 146334.2k 
HTTP P 567265 566811800k 884k 5.9M 
Ident P 7 7 0 0 317
IMAP P 224 248 0 8299.0k 
LotusNotes P 0 0 0 0 0
MCK-Signaling P 0 0 0 0 0
MSSQL P 1 1 0 0 66
NW5-CMD P 1 1 0 0 0
Oracle P 84 84 0 142.7k 
Persona P 0 0 0 0 0
POP3 P 5597 5587 2905 3019636k 
PPTP P 1 1 0 0 107
RDP P 1 1 0 0 65
RTCP-I P 0 0 0 0 0
RTP-I P 0 0 0 0 0
SMTBF P 1 1 0 0 0
SSH P 14 14 0 52051.6k 
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SSL P 10174 10166 55.4k 75.9k 1.5M 
T.120 P 0 0 0 0 0
Telnet P 43 43 0 526236k 
Timbuktu P 1 1 0 0 97
VNC P 1 1 0 3920.5k 
WebEx P 0 0 0 0 0
XWindows P 0 0 0 0 0
DCOM P 22 22 31 914.3k 
H.323 P 897 897 55 38 362
pcANYWHERE P 971 971 0 066.6k 
ICMP #NAME? 35648 35648 253 428112k 
High E  n/a 6589 6624844k 
DHCP P 0 0 0 0 0
Kerberos P 38 38 0 013.2k 
LDAP P 12 12 0 0 6
NTP P 8391 8391 0 42 1606
OracleEM P 0 0 0 0 0
RADIUS P 0 0 0 0 0
SNMP P 12281 12281 334 51124.4k 
Syslog P 0 0 0 0 0
Day-Time P 21 21 69 12 4572
DNS P 184894 184894 6219 4360843k 
INFOC-RTMS P 0 0 0 0 0
RIP P 1 1 0 0 0
SLP P 0 0 0 0 0
SMS P 126 126 460 124219k 
TimeServer P 36 36 2 2 416
WINS P 0 0 0 0 0
RSVP P 0 0 0 0 0
Low E  n/a 95.2k 80.7k 9.1M 
TCP_Port_10110 P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_10130 P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_17811 P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_2011 P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_5001 P 2 2 0 9 622
TCP_Port_5010 P 0 0 0 0 0
TCP_Port_85 P 0 0 0 0 0
UDP_Port_1235 P 0 0 0 0 0
UDP_Port_192 P 355 355 76 149 152
UDP_Port_5190 P 0 0 0 0 0
UDP_Port_6970 P 141 138 4854 453117.0k 
AFS P 0 0 0 0 0
BackWeb P 4 4 0 0 3115
Chaincast P 0 0 0 0 0
CIFS-TCP P 0 0 0 0 0
CVSpserver P 0 0 0 0 0
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FTP P 5300 529453.1k 31.7k 500k 
Gopher P 3 3 0 0 175
lockd P 1 1 0 0 0
Marimba P 2 2 26 26 26
MPEG-Audio P 25 25 1 1589k 
MPEG-Video P 161 161 0 547.6k 
MSN-Messenger P 191 190 202 73 7858
NNTP P 0 0 0 0 0
QuickTime P 6 6 0 7014.4k 
RC5DES P 9 9 0 0 379
Real P 254 254 2691 488034.7k 
rsync P 0 0 0 0 0
Shoutcast P 0 0 0 0 0
SMTP P 31992 31981 29.3k 25.9k 6.0M 
SSDP P 0 0 0 0 0
TFTP P 960 960 0 45 8161
WHOIS P 1 1 0 0 1
WinMedia P 301 299 9153 967226.3k 
YahooMsg P 30 30 196 115 1287
AOL-IM-ICQ P 137 137 551 24514.0k 
Echo P 0 0 0 0 0
ISAKMP P 1 1 0 0 4882
Kontiki P 16 16 0 0 283
Microsoft -ds P 119 119 0 59.0M 
NetBIOS-IP P 1507 1505 244 305 5794
NFS P 1 1 0 0 0
RTSP P 195 193 28 41 4109
SunRPC P 31 31 0 0 4
Protocol_41 P 1 1 0 0 1
Protocol_54 P 54 54 0 0 577
Finger  0n/a 0 0 0
rsh  0n/a 0 3 1367
SHARESUDP  0n/a 0 0 0
CU-DEV  0n/a 0 0 0
MeetingMaker  0n/a 0 0 0
NW5-NCP  9n/a 0 0 220
StreamWorks  2n/a 0 0 0
IPSec  1n/a 0 0 1801
Protocol_255  0n/a 0 0 0
DiscoveredPorts   n/a 939 795429k 
TCP_Port_10230  1n/a 0 91652.6k 
TCP_Port_15126  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_15533  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_18429  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_19052  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_20169  0n/a 0 0 0
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TCP_Port_2048  287n/a 51 42147k 
TCP_Port_2443  107n/a 0 2019.4k 
TCP_Port_26161  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_29798  3n/a 0 1 6461
TCP_Port_3000  4n/a 1 1 104
TCP_Port_34277  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_36931  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_37258  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_3899  0n/a 3 3 3
TCP_Port_42783  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_46481  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_46781  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_47067  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_50000  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_5100  4n/a 0 0 1468
TCP_Port_5190  34n/a 97 78 2950
TCP_Port_6009  42n/a 437 177 1578
TCP_Port_60090  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_60132  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_6016  220n/a 360 10113.9k 
TCP_Port_6099  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_63006  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_7755  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_8200  0n/a 74 57 184
TCP_Port_8282  2137n/a 28 40429k 
TCP_Port_8999  10n/a 0 022.8k 
TCP_Port_9324  0n/a 0 0 0
TCP_Port_9909  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_10615  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_1130 P 0 0 0 0 0
UDP_Port_1138 P 0 0 0 0 0
UDP_Port_1320  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_1622  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_1678  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_1920  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_2174  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_2312  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_25  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_2760  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_2767  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_2785  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_2944  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_3049  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_3059  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_3283  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_3403  0n/a 0 0 0
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UDP_Port_3568  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_3594  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_3918  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_4015  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_4473  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_6971  0n/a 0 0 0
UDP_Port_7001  19n/a 0 1 479
UDP_Port_9  1n/a 0 0 0
Default P I 20286 23167 13.9k 63772.9M 
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APPENDIX F 
 
PROTOCOLS AND SERVICES RECOGNIZED BY PACKETPUP 
 
Category Specific Instances 
FTP  FTPActive  
 FTPControl  
 FTPPassive 
HTTP  HTTP  
 HTTP-ACTIVEX  
 HTTP-CodeRed  
 HTTP-CodeRedII  
 HTTP-EXE  
 HTTP-IDA  
 HTTP-RAR  
 HTTPS  
 HTTP-Zip  
 DoubleClick 
A/V Stream  HTTP-AVI  
 HTTP-Audio-MPEG  
 HTTP-Video-MPEG  
 HTTP-QuickTime  
 HTTP-ShockWave-Flash  
 RealMedia 1 and 2  
 ShoutCast  
 WebRadio  
 WindowsMedia 
Peer-to-Peer  Aimster  
 AudioGalaxyLogin  
 AudioGalaxySearch  
 AudioGalaxyDownloadReq  
 AudioGalaxyXfer  
 Blubster  
 DirectConnect  
 Gnutella  
 Gnutella Web  
 GnutellaXfer  
 KaZaA  
 KaZaAXfer  
 Microsoft-DS  
 NapsterXfer  
 NetBIOX-SSN  
 ScourExchange  
 ScourExchangeXfer  
 SongSpy  
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 SpinFrenzy 
Remote Shell  Rlogin  
 REXEC 
 RSH  
 SSH  
 Telnet  
 XWindows  
 VNC 
Other TCP   
Non-IP  
Other IP  Finger 
 Gopher 
Messaging  AIMLogin  
 AIMXfer  
 AIMMsg  
 ICQLogin  
 ICQMsg  
 MSNMessengerLogin  
 MSNMessengerXfer  
 E-mail/Newsgroups  
 IMAP  
 IMAPS  
 NNTP  
 POP  
 POP3S  
 SMTP  
 Hotmail  
 YahooMail 
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APPENDIX G 
 
SAMPLE DATA FROM PACKETPUP LOGFILE 
 
Feb 21 9:26:58 packetpup[1188]:Parsed rule HTTP on line 66 
Feb 21 9:26:58 packetpup[1188]:Finished reading rule file 
Feb 21 9:26:58 packetpup[1188]:listening on network device \Device\NPF_{6F35C19A-8365-4E2F-8ACB-DFD263669DE4} 
Feb 21 9:26:58 packetpup[1188]:Allocated 1048576 bytes for PCAP buffer. 
Feb 21 9:26:58 packetpup[1188]:listening 
Feb 21 9:26:58 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 206.46.170.98.34317 -> 151.141.8.105.25 
Feb 21 9:26:58 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,206.46.170.98,34317,151.141.8.105,25 
Feb 21 9:26:59 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP3S: 151.141.12.204.2866 -> 151.141.8.105.995 
Feb 21 9:26:59 packetpup[1188]:M POP3S,151.141.12.204,2866,151.141.8.105,995 
Feb 21 9:26:59 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP: 151.141.8.103.110 -> 151.141.8.104.6042 
Feb 21 9:26:59 packetpup[1188]:M POP,151.141.8.103,110,151.141.8.104,6042 
Feb 21 9:26:59 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.48.22.1569 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:26:59 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.48.22,1569,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:26:59 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 64.124.168.46.8766 -> 151.141.8.105.25 
Feb 21 9:26:59 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,64.124.168.46,8766,151.141.8.105,25 
Feb 21 9:26:59 packetpup[1188]:Email/News Connection 64.124.168.46.8766->151.141.8.105.25 terminated 5.08 Packets/sec 
Feb 21 9:26:59 packetpup[1188]:F Email/News,64.124.168.46,8766,151.141.8.105,25,12,2,0.15,25.08 
Feb 21 9:27:00 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 151.141.99.22.1464 -> 151.141.8.105.25 
Feb 21 9:27:00 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,151.141.99.22,1464,151.141.8.105,25 
Feb 21 9:27:00 packetpup[1188]:151.141.47.44.1215 151.141.8.105.80 mail.etsu.edu /exchange 
Feb 21 9:27:00 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP3S: 151.141.31.77.4205 -> 151.141.8.105.995 
Feb 21 9:27:00 packetpup[1188]:M POP3S,151.141.31.77,4205,151.141.8.105,995 
Feb 21 9:27:01 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 151.141.8.103.25 -> 151.141.8.104.6044 
Feb 21 9:27:01 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,151.141.8.103,25,151.141.8.104,6044 
Feb 21 9:27:01 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP: 151.141.8.103.110 -> 151.141.8.104.6047 
Feb 21 9:27:01 packetpup[1188]:M POP,151.141.8.103,110,151.141.8.104,6047 
Feb 21 9:27:02 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.47.44.1216 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:02 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.47.44,1216,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:02 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 206.105.206.72.4710 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:02 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,206.105.206.72,4710,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:03 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 151.141.99.22.1465 -> 151.141.8.105.25 
Feb 21 9:27:03 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,151.141.99.22,1465,151.141.8.105,25 
Feb 21 9:27:03 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 151.141.99.22.1466 -> 151.141.8.105.25 
Feb 21 9:27:03 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,151.141.99.22,1466,151.141.8.105,25 
Feb 21 9:27:03 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.76.248.1044 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:03 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.76.248,1044,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:04 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 151.141.8.103.25 -> 151.141.8.104.6049 
Feb 21 9:27:04 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,151.141.8.103,25,151.141.8.104,6049 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 206.106.119.10.4648 -> 151.141.8.105.25 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,206.106.119.10,4648,151.141.8.105,25 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 24.106.95.18.2175 -> 151.141.8.105.25 
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Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,24.106.95.18,2175,151.141.8.105,25 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP3S: 151.141.41.212.2644 -> 151.141.8.105.995 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:M POP3S,151.141.41.212,2644,151.141.8.105,995 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP: 151.141.8.103.110 -> 151.141.8.104.6053 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:M POP,151.141.8.103,110,151.141.8.104,6053 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule IMAPS: 160.36.210.70.1073 -> 151.141.8.105.993 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:M IMAPS,160.36.210.70,1073,151.141.8.105,993 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule IMAP: 151.141.8.103.143 -> 151.141.8.104.5373 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:M IMAP,151.141.8.103,143,151.141.8.104,5373 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.46.106.1347 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:06 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.46.106,1347,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:07 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.59.188.1107 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:07 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.59.188,1107,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:08 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 216.39.115.52.4430 -> 151.141.8.105.25 
Feb 21 9:27:08 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,216.39.115.52,4430,151.141.8.105,25 
Feb 21 9:27:11 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.47.44.1217 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:11 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.47.44,1217,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:11 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 68.54.96.36.2081 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:11 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,68.54.96.36,2081,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:11 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.47.44.1218 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:11 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.47.44,1218,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:12 packetpup[1188]:151.141.62.167.2010 151.141.8.105.80 mail.etsu.edu /default.asp 
Feb 21 9:27:12 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.76.248.1045 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:12 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.76.248,1045,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:12 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP3S: 151.141.55.192.3319 -> 151.141.8.105.995 
Feb 21 9:27:12 packetpup[1188]:M POP3S,151.141.55.192,3319,151.141.8.105,995 
Feb 21 9:27:13 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP: 151.141.8.103.110 -> 151.141.8.104.6054 
Feb 21 9:27:13 packetpup[1188]:M POP,151.141.8.103,110,151.141.8.104,6054 
Feb 21 9:27:13 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule IMAPS: 151.141.8.57.63778 -> 151.141.8.105.993 
Feb 21 9:27:13 packetpup[1188]:M IMAPS,151.141.8.57,63778,151.141.8.105,993 
Feb 21 9:27:13 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 151.141.8.57.63777 -> 151.141.8.105.25 
Feb 21 9:27:13 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,151.141.8.57,63777,151.141.8.105,25 
Feb 21 9:27:13 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 24.159.43.221.4966 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:13 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,24.159.43.221,4966,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:14 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.68.167.2315 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:14 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.68.167,2315,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:14 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.62.167.2011 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:14 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.62.167,2011,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:16 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP3S: 151.141.59.124.1132 -> 151.141.8.105.995 
Feb 21 9:27:16 packetpup[1188]:M POP3S,151.141.59.124,1132,151.141.8.105,995 
Feb 21 9:27:16 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP: 151.141.8.103.110 -> 151.141.8.104.6055 
Feb 21 9:27:16 packetpup[1188]:M POP,151.141.8.103,110,151.141.8.104,6055 
Feb 21 9:27:16 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP3S: 63.162.206.106.2865 -> 151.141.8.105.995 
Feb 21 9:27:16 packetpup[1188]:M POP3S,63.162.206.106,2865,151.141.8.105,995 
Feb 21 9:27:17 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP: 151.141.8.103.110 -> 151.141.8.104.6056 
Feb 21 9:27:17 packetpup[1188]:M POP,151.141.8.103,110,151.141.8.104,6056 
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Feb 21 9:27:17 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.47.44.1219 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:17 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.47.44,1219,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:17 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.46.106.1346 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:17 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.46.106,1346,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:18 packetpup[1188]:WWW Connection 151.141.68.167.2315->151.141.8.105.443 terminated.63 Packets/sec 
Feb 21 9:27:18 packetpup[1188]:F WWW,151.141.68.167,2315,151.141.8.105,443,1138,7,0.26,1.63 
Feb 21 9:27:18 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 151.141.99.22.1469 -> 151.141.8.105.25 
Feb 21 9:27:18 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,151.141.99.22,1469,151.141.8.105,25 
Feb 21 9:27:19 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.68.167.2316 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:19 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.68.167,2316,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:19 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 151.141.8.103.25 -> 151.141.8.104.6058 
Feb 21 9:27:19 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,151.141.8.103,25,151.141.8.104,6058 
Feb 21 9:27:20 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule NNTP: 151.141.8.57.63796 -> 151.141.8.105.119 
Feb 21 9:27:20 packetpup[1188]:M NNTP,151.141.8.57,63796,151.141.8.105,119 
Feb 21 9:27:20 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 216.33.97.76.39843 -> 151.141.8.105.25 
Feb 21 9:27:20 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,216.33.97.76,39843,151.141.8.105,25 
Feb 21 9:27:21 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 151.141.99.22.1470 -> 151.141.8.105.25 
Feb 21 9:27:21 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,151.141.99.22,1470,151.141.8.105,25 
Feb 21 9:27:21 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 65.162.104.178.1410 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:21 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,65.162.104.178,1410,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:22 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 151.141.8.106.25 -> 151.141.8.104.6062 
Feb 21 9:27:22 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,151.141.8.106,25,151.141.8.104,6062 
Feb 21 9:27:22 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.62.167.2012 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:22 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.62.167,2012,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:23 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.62.167.2013 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:23 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.62.167,2013,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:23 packetpup[1188]:WWW Connection 151.141.76.248.1044->151.141.8.105.443 terminated 30 Packets/sec 
Feb 21 9:27:23 packetpup[1188]:F WWW,151.141.76.248,1044,151.141.8.105,443,714,6,0.04,0.30 
Feb 21 9:27:23 packetpup[1188]:WWW Connection 151.141.76.248.1045->151.141.8.105.443 terminated.69 Packets/sec 
Feb 21 9:27:23 packetpup[1188]:F WWW,151.141.76.248,1045,151.141.8.105,443,1113,8,0.09,0.69 
Feb 21 9:27:23 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP3S: 24.158.97.34.21850 -> 151.141.8.105.995 
Feb 21 9:27:23 packetpup[1188]:M POP3S,24.158.97.34,21850,151.141.8.105,995 
Feb 21 9:27:24 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule POP: 151.141.8.103.110 -> 151.141.8.104.6065 
Feb 21 9:27:24 packetpup[1188]:M POP,151.141.8.103,110,151.141.8.104,6065 
Feb 21 9:27:24 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 151.141.85.199.1171 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:24 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,151.141.85.199,1171,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:24 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 24.158.137.162.1378 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:24 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,24.158.137.162,1378,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:24 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule SMTP: 151.141.8.106.25 -> 151.141.8.104.6067 
Feb 21 9:27:24 packetpup[1188]:M SMTP,151.141.8.106,25,151.141.8.104,6067 
Feb 21 9:27:25 packetpup[1188]:WWW Connection 24.158.137.162.1378->151.141.8.105.443 terminated 66 Packets/sec 
Feb 21 9:27:25 packetpup[1188]:F WWW,24.158.137.162,1378,151.141.8.105,443,741,5,0.82,5.66 
Feb 21 9:27:25 packetpup[1188]:Packet matched rule HTTPS: 24.158.137.162.1380 -> 151.141.8.105.443 
Feb 21 9:27:25 packetpup[1188]:M HTTPS,24.158.137.162,1380,151.141.8.105,443 
Feb 21 9:27:27 packetpup[1188]:WWW Connection 151.141.62.167.2012->151.141.8.105.443 terminated 5.80 Packets/sec  
Feb 21 9:27:27 packetpup[1188]:F WWW,151.141.62.167,2012,151.141.8.105,443,2350,27,0.49,5.80 
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APPENDIX H 
 
TOP TEN CLASS MEMBERS 
 
Pie charts indicating the top 10 members of the different subclasses of the traffic tree 
categorized on the basis of the average flow rate are shown below. 
 
Inbound Traffic 
 
Inbound Traffic : Top 10
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Outbound Traffic 
 
Outbound Traffic : Top 10
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Inbound/Discovered Ports 
Inbound Discovered Ports : Top 10
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Outbound/Discovered Ports 
Outbound Discovered Ports : Top 10
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Inbound / High 
Inbound High Priority Traffic : Top 10
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Inbound / Average 
 
Inbound Average Priority Traffic : Top 10
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Outbound / Average 
 
Outbound Average Priority Traffic : Top 10
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Inbound / Low 
Inbound Low Priority Traffic : Top 10
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Outbound / Low 
 
Outbound Low Priority Traffic : Top 10
40%
24%
16%
2%
1%
1%
1%
3%
9%
1% 2%
SMTP FTP Microsoft-ds WinMedia
Real TCP_Port_10130 MPEG-Audio TCP_Port_10110
UDP_Port_6970 MPEG-Video All other classes
 
 
 
 142
APPENDIX I 
 
MALICIOUS DATA ON LEGITIMATE PORTS 
 
 
Name Occurrences 
AddRem joke 1 
Anticmos 1 
Antiexe 3 
AX/Frame-Exploit 1 
Backdoor-RQ 1 
Bonus joke 1 
Downloader-W 2 
EICAR  1 
Exploit-MIME.gen 9 
Exploit-MIME.gen.b 22495 
Exploit-MIME.gen.exe 65 
Flipped joke 2 
Form 3 
Geschenk joke 2 
Happy99 4 
IRC-Sdbot 1 
JS/CardStealer 1 
JS/Cisp 2 
JS/Downloader-W 1 
JS/Exploit 2 
JS/Fortnight.b@M 2 
JS/Fortnight@M 2 
JS/IEStart.gen.c 126 
JS/Kak@M 24 
JS/NoClose 143 
JS/Seeker.gen.e 512 
JS/Seeker.gen.f 7 
JS/Seeker.i 7 
JS/Seeker.p 1 
JS/Seeker.t 12 
JS/Seeker.u 6 
Linux/Exploit-SendMail 1 
MessageMate joke 8 
MP3Search 2 
MP3Search.ldr 2 
MultiDropper-AC 2 
New UNIX 1 
New Worm 1 
One-Half.mp.3544a 1 
Only joke 1 
Salary joke 3 
ServU-Daemon 7 
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Snowman joke 1 
Socoten 1 
Splash joke 1 
StealthBoot 13 
StressRelief joke 1 
Suspicious IFrame.a 17 
Unsafe JS 8 
VBA/Generic 2 
VBS/LoveLetter@MM 2 
VBS/Redlof.dam 1 
VBS/Redlof@M 39 
W32/Aplore.htm 1 
W32/BadTrans@MM 5 
W32/BleBla.b@MM 2 
W32/Braid.a@MM 3 
W32/Bugbear@MM 118 
W32/Elkern.cav.c 44 
W32/Gibe.b@MM 7 
W32/Gibe.gen@MM 1 
W32/HLLP.Hantaner 3 
W32/Hybris.gen@MM 18 
W32/Klez.dam 6 
W32/Klez.e@MM 1 
W32/Klez.eml 18 
W32/Klez.gen@MM 10 
W32/Klez.h@MM 25515 
W32/Klez.rar 41 
W32/Korvar 4 
W32/Lirva 7 
W32/Lirva.a@MM 33 
W32/Lirva.c@MM 10 
W32/Lirva.dam 1 
W32/Magistr.a@MM 89 
W32/Magistr.b.dam1 2 
W32/Magistr.b@MM 106 
W32/Magistr.dam3 6 
W32/Myparty.a@MM 12 
W32/Navidad.e@M 1 
W32/Nimda.eml 9 
W32/Nimda.gen@MM 39 
W32/Nimda.htm 5 
W32/Nimda.q@MM 2 
W32/Nimda@MM 61 
W32/ProLin@MM 1 
W32/SirCam@MM 113 
W32/Ska@M 2 
W32/Sobig@MM 4707 
W32/SQLSpida 1 
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W32/Supova.worm 1 
W32/Yaha.e@MM 3 
W32/Yaha.g.dam 1 
W32/Yaha.g@MM 1838 
W32/Yaha.gen 2 
W32/Yaha.k 145 
W32/Yaha.k@MM 135 
W32/Yaha.l 2 
W32/Yaha.l@MM 7 
W95/Kuang.gen 2 
W97M/Assilem.c.gen 2 
W97M/Class 36 
W97M/ColdApe.gen 13 
W97M/Ded.gen 1 
W97M/Ethan.a 7 
W97M/Groov.gen 2 
W97M/Jerk.gen 1 
W97M/Locale.gen 33 
W97M/Marker.gen 87 
W97M/Marker.o 3 
W97M/Melissa.a@MM 21 
W97M/Melissa.gen@MM 1 
W97M/Nsi.e.gen 3 
W97M/Proverb.gen 8 
W97M/Replog.gen 2 
W97M/Thus.gen 9 
W97M/Titch.d.gen 88 
W97M/Tristate.gen 2 
WM/Cap 4 
Wyx 1 
X97M/Tristate.gen 2 
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